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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a conflict between the long standing rule oflaw in Idaho that every 
property has a constitutional right of reasonable access to adjacent roadways and a recent attempt 
by the City of Meridian to deny access to the state highway to property owners within City 
limits. The State ofIdaho has exclusive jurisdiction over state highways, including State 
Highway 20/26 (Chinden Blvd.) which passes through the City of Meridian. Although the City 
has no authority to regulate access to a state highway, in order to assist the State of Idaho with 
"corridor preservation" along the highway, which will make right of way less expensive for the 
State to purchase in the future, the City adopted an Ordinance barring access to state highways 
located within the City. 
There is also an issue of waiver, as the City argued that a passing reference in a staff 
report constitutes a binding waiver by the property owner's predecessor to never seek access to 
the state highway. The District Court primarily addressed the waiver argument, fmding for the 
City, and only mentioned in passing that the ultra vires nature of the City'S Ordinance is 
irrelevant because it does not bind lTD. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Wylie filed a Complaint against the State ofIdaho Transportation Department 
(hereinafter "lTD") and the City of Meridian (hereinafter "City") on May 6, 2009. Wylie is the 
owner of real property located in the City which abuts State Highway 20/26 1 (SH 20126) and 
1 State Highway 20/26 is also known as Chin den Boulevard. 
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Linder Road.2 Wylie sought a declaratory judgment on the basis that lTD has exclusive 
jurisdiction over SH 20/26 and the City's ordinance which bars access to state highways is ultra 
VIres. 
Wylie filed an Amended Complaint on May 11, 2009,3 and a Second Amended 
Complaint on May 15, 2009, further alleging that ITD's Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
(IDAP A) entitles Wylie to obtain two access points from the property at issue to SH 20/26.4 
The City filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on June 8, 
2009, pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(1), on the grounds that Wylie had failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. 5 
Wylie filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the State has exclusive 
jurisdiction over SH 20126 and that City Ordinance 05-1171 (hereinafter "Ordinance") was an 
ultra vires attempt to control access to and from Wylie's property and SH 20126.6 Wylie also 
moved for summary judgment on the issue of standing. In support of his standing, Wylie argued 
that a party must have a personal stake, i.e. a distinct and palpable injury, in the outcome of the 
declaratory action to gain standing. Since Wylie's property directly abuts SH 20/26 and a denial 
of access to SH 20126 significantly reduced the fair market value of his property, his injury 
caused by the Ordinance is distinct and palpable. 
2 R, Vol. I, pp. 6-7. 
3 R, Vol. I, pp. 13-16. 
4 R, Vol. I, pp. 17-20. 
5 R, Vol. III, p. 467. 
6 R, Vol. I, pp. 25-26. 
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On September 28,2009, oral argument was held.7 Due to the various motions' 
substantive overlaps, the Court heard argument concerning the City's Motion to Dismiss, 
Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment in 
one hearing and then took the various motions under advisement. 
8 
The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on December 1, 2009, denying 
Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the City's Motion to Dismiss, but re-
characterized the City's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
9 
A copy ofthe 
Court's decision is attached hereto as Appendix A for the Court's convenience. 
Wylie filed his Notice of Appeal on January 6,2010.
10 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Wylie is the current owner of approximately 10 acres of real property located on the 
southwest comer of the intersection ofSH 20/26 and Linder Road in the City of Meridian. The 
property is zoned C-H as vacant commercial land, and is commonly known as the Knighthill 
Center Subdivision (hereinafter "Subdivision,,).11 
The northern boundary of the property is immediately adjacent to SH 20/26 with 
approximately 650 feet 0 f lineal frontage thereon. 12 The eastern boundary 0 f the property is 
immediately adjacent to Linder Road. 13 The south and west borders do not front roads. 
7 Tr., Vol. I, pp. 1-49. 
8 Tr., Vol. I, p. 6, L. 25 to p. 8, L. 19;Tr., Vol. I, p. 48, L. 5-10. 
9 R, Vol. III, pp 467-472. Attached hereto as Appendix A. 
10 R, Vol. III, pp. 476-479. 
11 R, Vol. I, p. 88. 
12 R, Vol. I, p. 88. 
13 R, Vol. I, pp. 88-89. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8 
SH 20126 is owned and controlled by ITD. Linder Road is owned and controlled by 
ACHD. lTD has expressly defined SH 20/26 as being a part of the state highway system in its 
Milepost Logs by way ofIDAPA Rule 39.03.48.300.14 
On August 30, 2005, the City passed Ordinance 05-1171, codified as Meridian City Code 
(M.C.C.) § 11-3Hl, et seq., which was established "to preserve right of way for future highway 
expansions." M.C.C. § 11-3H-1(b).15 One of the specific measures adopted by the City to 
achieve this end is the prohibition and restriction of access to SH 20/26 in the event the use of 
the property changes to a higher or more intense use. The pertinent portions of the Ordinance 
are: 
11-3H-1: PURPOSE: The regulations ofthis article are intended to achieve three 
(3) purposes: a) limit access points to state highways in order to maintain traffic 
flow and provide better circulation and safety within the community and for the 
traveling public, b) to preserve right of way for future highway expansions, and c) 
design new residential development along state highways to mitigate noise 
impacts associated with such roadways. (emphasis added). 
11-3H-2: APPLICABILITY: The following standards shall apply to all 
development along state highways, including, but not limited to, State Highway 
69, State Highway 55, State Highway 20-26 and Interstate 84 ... 
11-3H-4: STANDARDS: 
B. Access to and/or from State Highway 69, State Highway 55, and State 
Highway 20-26: 
1. Use of existing approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that 
all ofthe following conditions are met: 
b. The nature ofthe use does not change (for example a residential 
use to a commercial use). 
14 1 R, Vo . I, p. 29; R, Vol. I, p. 49. 
15 R, Vol. I, pp. 131-34. Attached hereto as Appendix B for the Court's convenience. 
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c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an 
increase in the number of residential dwelling units or an increase 
in the square footage of commercial space. 
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity 0 f use, the 
owner shall develop or otherwise acquire access to a street other than a 
state highway. The use of the existing approach shall cease and the 
approach shall be abandoned and removed. 
a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be 
allowed. (emphasis added). 16 
After the passage ofthe Ordinance on July 18, 2006, Wylie's predecessor in interest 
entered into a development agreement with the City to annex the land for the Subdivision into 
the City. The agreement required that the Subdivision's development plans adhere to all 
applicable City ordinances. The exact wording of the clause is: 
5.1.2 That all future development of the subject property shall be constructed in 
accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of the development. 17 
Another term of the development agreement incorporated City of Meridian Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision Order, dated May, 9, 2006, which contains an 
attached staff report. 18 On the fourth page ofthe staff report the following statement appears: 
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 20-
26) but is not proposing direct access to that facility. 19 
Wylie purchased the Subdivision, and on February 24,2009, after discovering that the 
Ordinance barred access to SH 20/26, Wylie filed an application for a variance from the 
16 Attached hereto as Appendix C for the Court's convenience. 
17 R, Vol. I, p. 151; R, Vol. I, p. 194. A copy of the development agreement is attached hereto as Appendix D for 
the Court's convenience. 
18 R, Vol. I, p. 197. 
19 R, Vol. II, p. 210. 
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Ordinance.2o On May 5,2009, the City denied Wylie's request?l The reasoning behind the 
City's denial of Wylie's request for the variance was the Ordinance?2 The pertinent language 
used to deny Wylie's variance request is as follows: 
1) Granting this variance would grant a right or special privilege given that the City 
of Meridian has a specific ordinance with respect to limiting access to state 
highways as set forth in Section 11-3H of the Meridian Unified Development 
Code. (emphasis added)?3 
On May 6, 2009, Wylie filed a Complaint in the district court, naming the State, ITD, and 
the City as Defendants?4 The Complaint sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the 
Ordinance was invalid as an ultra vires usurpation ofITD's exclusive jurisdiction to control 
access to the state highway system. 
After commencement of the suit, Wylie moved for a Summary Judgment on the grounds 
that passage of the Ordinance was void as an ultra vires act. Wylie's arguments were: 
A) Only the State, through ITD, has control over access on roadways which comprise the 
state highway system; 25 
B) SH 20126 is part of the state highway system; 
C) The City has no authority to control access over this stretch of road; 
D) The City's attempt to control access to the state highway system through City 
Ordinance 05-1171 was outside of its statutory authority; 
E) Any act by a governmental entity which is outside of its statutory authority is ultra 
VIres; 
F) Ultra vires acts have no force oflaw and are null and void; and 
G) Since City Ordinance 05-1171 was void, Wylie was not bound by the clause in the 
development agreement which requires the development of the Subdivision to adhere to 
all City ordinances. 
20 I R., Vo . 1., p. 88. 
21 R., Vol. II., pp. 328-32. 
22 R., Vol. II., p. 331. 
23 R., Vol. II., p. 331. 
24 R., Vol. 1., pp. 6-9. 
25 This is a field preemption argument. Wylie argued field preemption and ultra vires below; due to virtually 
indistinguishable intelTelationship between the arguments, they were both refelTed as ultra vires. However, for the 
purposes of this Brief, both doctrines are expressly distinguished and argued separately for clarity. 
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In the Defendants' Response Brief to Wylie's Brief in Support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment, lTD did not argue against the doctrine of ultra vires, or the doctrine's 
application to the development agreement. The State argued that the City had statutory authority 
enabling it to control access to the state highway system, contrary to the position previously 
advocated by the State in other cases. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order/6 the District Court did not directly address the 
issue concerning which entity or entities can control access to the state highway system. The 
Court denied Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the development 
agreement between the City and Wylie's predecessor in interest precluded Wylie from seeking 
access to SH 20126, and therefore a ruling that the Ordinance was ultra vires would constitute an 
advisory opinion because Wylie would still be bound by the agreement. 
The Court's rationale, detailed in its Memorandum Decision and Order, is summarized as 
follows: 
A) Wylie is requesting a declaratory judgment; 
B) A threshold issue for a declaratory judgment is justiciability; 
C) One the prerequisites of a justiciable issue is that the declaratory judgment would 
resolve an actual case or controversy; 
D) In the development agreement at issue, Wylie, through his predecessor in interest, 
contractually waived his ability to seek access to SH 20126 from his property; 
E) Therefore, even if City Ordinance 05-1171 was declared ultra vires and void, the 
declaration would not provide Wylie relief because he is bound by the development 
agreement. 
The Court also ruled that the agreement was valid and not an ultra vires attempt by the 
City to circumvent the State's authority to control access to SH 20/26: 
26 R, Vol. III, pp. 467-472. 
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..................... ------------------
First of all, lTD is not a signatory to this agreement and, therefore, would not be bound 
by its terms. Secondly, the agreement does not limit lTD's authority to grant 
encroachment permits for access to SH 20/26. See, e.g., lTD's Administrative Policy A-
12-01; State Highway Access Control. Rather, it merely restricts Plaintiffs [Wylie] 
ability to seek such a permit. A similar conclusion was reached when Plaintiffs 
[Wylie's] application for an encroachment permit was denied in a letter from lTD's chief 
engineer[.] (citation omitted). This Court has been cited to no authority, nor is it aware of 
any such authority, that an agreement by a landowner to forego applying for an 
encroachment permit contravenes any law or public policy thereby constituting illegal 
consideration. (citation omitted)?7 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does The Ordinance conflict with provisions of the Idaho Code, I.e. § 40-301, et seq. 
and I.e. § 67-6528, which provide that only the State can control access to the state highway 
system, rendering the ordinance void under the doctrine of field preemption? 
2. Was The Ordinance passed without any legislative authorization, rendering the 
ordinance void under the doctrine of ultra vires? 
3. Does the language in the City Staff Report, incorporated into the development 
agreement, function as an enforceable waiver? 
4. If the language in the development agreement constitutes a waiver of the right to seek 
direct access from the Subdivision to SH 20126, does field preemption, ultra vires, or public 
policy invalidate the waiver? 
5. Is lTD prevented, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, from arguing that the City 
can regulate access to State highways? 
77 - R., Vol. III, p. 471. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court applies the same standard for review of a decision on a summary judgment 
motion as the lower court: 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the 
same standard as used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary 
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter o flaw. , This Court liberally 
construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the 
motion. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. However, if the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the motion for 
summary judgment. (citations omitted). Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 374-75, 3 P.3d 
51,52-53 (2000). 
As to issues oflaw, the Appellate Court exercises free review ofthe trial court's decision. 
Bouten Co nstr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999); See 
also City o/Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219,221,912 P.2d 106,108 (1996); Harris 
v. Dep'tofHealth & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156,1158 (1992). 
This Court exercises free review over an issue of statutory construction, which begins 
from the statute's literal words: 
... [A]n issue of statutory construction, [which] is subject to our free review. 
Interpretation ofa statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. If the 
language of the statute is unambiguous, 'the clear expressed intent of the legislature must 
be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.' (citations quotations omitted). 
Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,859,993 P.2d 617,622 (Ct. App.2000). 
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B. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS AN ABUTTING ROADWAY IS A PROPERTY 
RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
Idaho has long recognized that access to a public right-of-way is one of the fundamental 
components and vested rights of ownership ofland. The principle was ftrst elucidated in Village 
a/Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 757, 95 P. 945, 947 (1908) by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
While the public generally may have no special or particular interest in the right 
of ingress to any particular lot owner's property, the lot owner has a very material 
and special interest in having the public reach his property and place of business, 
and in his right to go and come and carryon business and invite the public to his 
place of business. It has been held by the courts that to cut offthis right of ingress 
and egress would be to take the lot owner's property without due process oflaw. 
(Citations omitted). 
In Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 586-587, 347 P.2d 996,998 (1959), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Access to a public way is one ofthe incidents of ownership ofland bounding 
thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is a vested right of which the 
lot owner cannot be deprived without just compensation. (Citation omitted). 
The rule was similarly stated in Hadfield v. State ex reI. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d 
1018, 1021 (1964): 
This court has long recognized that access to a public way is one of the incidents of 
ownership of land bounding thereon; that such right of access constitutes an interest in, 
and is appurtenant to, the land. It is a vested right of which the property owner cannot be 
deprived without just compensation. (Citations omitted). 
See also Continental Oil Co. v City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 107,286 P. 353, 359 
(1930); Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514, 519, 254 P.2d 417,420 (1953); Killinger 
v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000); Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 
295,328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Mabe v. State ex reI. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 227, 360 P.2d 799, 
801-802 (1961); Bare v. Department a/Highways, 88 Idaho 467, 471,401 P.2d 552,554 (1965). 
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The Subdivision, due to its contiguity to SH 20/26, has an appurtenant property right of 
access to SH 20126. This access right is subject to reasonable regulation, but only by entities 
with legal authority to regulate the adjacent roadways. In this case, ACHD can regulate the right 
of access on Linder and lTD can regulate the right of access on SH 20/26. The City of Meridian 
has no authority to interfere with Wylie's access rights to either roadway. 
C. THE LEGISLATURE HAS EXPRESSLY PEREMPTED LOCAL 
CONTROL OVER STATE HIGHWAYS 
1. Local ordinances which have been expressly or impliedly preempted are void 
The Idaho Constitution, Art. 12, § 2, provides that city or county ordinances may not 
conflict with state statutes: 
§ 2. Local police regulations authorized. Any county or incorporated city or town may 
make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as 
are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. 
Therefore, a municipal corporation cannot act contrary to the general laws ofldaho. A 
law 0 f general application is, among other things, an act of the state legislature. State v. Clark, 
88 Idaho 365, 375, 399 P.2d 955,960 (1965). The doctrine offield preemption is a litmus 
utilized by Idaho courts to determine how the Legislature, through the general laws, has balanced 
power between the State and municipal governments. 
Legislative intent to preempt local control over an area oflaw can be found expressly or 
through implication. Express preemption is found when a statutory language expressly disallows 
the anticipated local legislation. State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). 
"The doctrine of implied preemption typically applies in instance where, despite the lack 
of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental entities, the State has acted in 
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the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire 
field ofregulation." Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee County, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 
735 P.2d 998,1000 (1987). A municipal organization " ... cannot act in an area which is so 
completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern. Caesar v. 
State, 101 Idaho at 161,610 P.2d at 520 (1980)." 
Classification of a matter as either 'local' or 'statewide' is made by the nature of the 
matter at issue. Those matters which are governmental or public in nature" ... are considered to 
be of statewide concern, and not purely municipal or local." Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 
161,610 P.2d 517, 520 (1980). 
Acts which are either expressly or impliedly preempted are void. Arthur v. Shoshone 
County, l33 Idaho 854,861-62, 993 P.2d 617, 624-25 (2000) ("A local ordinance that conflicts 
with a state law, or is preempted by state regulation of the subject matter, is void")(citing to 
Envirosafe Servo of Idaho V. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998,1000 (1987)); 
See also, Caesar V. State, 101 Idaho 158, 161,610 P.2d 517,520 (1980)( "The [local 
governmental entity] cannot act in an area which is so completely covered by general law as to 
indicate that it is a matter of state concern"). 
2. The Legislature has expressly given exclusive control to lTD over state highways 
Idaho Code, Title 40, confers exclusive authority over State Highways to lTD. 
I.e. § 40-301 states: 
Idaho transportation board - Creation - Authority. - There is established the 
Idaho transportation board, which is vested with authority, control, supervision 
and administration of the department created and established by this title. 
lTD is vested with the power to identifY, designate, and restrict or prohibit access to state 
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highways: 
POWERS AND DUTIES -- STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM. The board shall: 
(1) Determine which highways in the state, or sections of highways, shall be 
designated and accepted for the purpose of this title as a part of the state highway 
system. I. C. § 40-310(1). 
(9) Designate state highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and 
regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways to serve the traffic for which 
the facility is intended. I.e. § 40-310(9). 
Idaho Administrative Code § 39.03.48.000 et. seq., promulgated by lTD pursuant to its 
rule-making authority prescribed under I.e. § 40-312, restates and reaffirms lTD's exclusive 
authority over state highways?8 Title 39 Chapter 48 of the Idaho Administrative Code expressly 
affirms the reservation ofITD's exclusive authority over all state highways: 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. - [ ... ] The intent of this legislative provision is to 
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide 
importance. [ ... ]. IDAPA § 39.03.48.001 (emphasis added). 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. - The Idaho Transportation Board is authorized 
[ ... ] to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations affecting state highways; [ ... ] 
to determine which highways or sections of highways shall be part of the state 
highway system; and [ ... ] to identify the major transportation systems of 
statewide importance which would be exempt from local plans and ordinances 
[ ... ]. IDAPA § 39.03.48.000 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
100. STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM DESIGNATION. - The state highway 
system consists of those major highway transportation routes designated by the 
Idaho Transportation Board [ ... ] and is hereby determined to be part of the 
"transportation systems of statewide importance". IDAP A § 39.03.48.100 
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
Title 39 Chapter 48 of the Idaho Administrative Code then provides for the 
identification of what routes constitute the state highway system: 
28 R, Vol. I, pp. 32-41. 
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300. EXISTING STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM. - The state highway system is 
not a permanent configuration or mileage because of additions or deletions over 
time. The official system description is kept current in the Department's records 
(Milepost and Coded Segment System) and is available to the public upon 
request. IDAPA § 39.03.48.300. 
Those records specifically list SH 20126, at the Linder Rd. intersection, as part of the state 
highway system. 29 
The state highway system, and authority thereover, is distinct from other highway 
systems in the State. Title 40 of the Idaho Code explicitly distinguishes between state, county, 
district, and city systems and confers responsibility for each to their respective jurisdictions: 
There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of county 
highways in each county, a system of highways in each highway district, and a 
system of highways in each city, except as otherwise provided. The improvement 
of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the established and 
permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby imposed upon the 
state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, to improve and 
maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction [ ... J. I.e. § 40-201 
(emphasis added). 
In doing so, Title 40 ofthe Idaho Code lays out an expansive defmition of what 
constitutes the "state highway system" while expressly narrowing the defmition of other systems 
defmed therein, including that of a "city system." 
29 
"State highway system" means the principal highway arteries in the state, 
including connecting arteries and extensions through cities, and includes 
roads to every county seat in the state. I.e. § 40-120(4) (emphasis added). 
R., Vol. I, p 49. 
"City system" means all public highways within the corporate limits of a 
city [ ... J except those highways which are [ ... J a part of the state highway 
system [ ... J. I.C. § 40-104(1) (emphasis added). 
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"Highway district system" means all public highways within each 
highway district, except those included within the state highway system 
[ ... ]. I.e. § 40-109(1) (emphasis added). 
"County highway system" or "county secondary highways" mean all 
public highways in a county except those included within the state 
highway system, [ ... ]. I.C. § 40-104(6) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly recognized the distinctions between the highway 
systems. See Lido Van & Storage, Inc. v Kuck, 110 Idaho 939, 719 P.2d 1199 (1986). (All public 
roadways not included in the federal highway system, the state highway system, or a city street 
system, are necessarily a part ofthe county highway system). 
In light of the foregoing, the Idaho Legislature has expressly determined that lTD 
exclusively has the duty and responsibility of regulating access to the state highway system, of 
which SH 20/26 is a part. When the City enacted the Ordinance which purports to " ... limit 
access points to state highways ... ," the City was acting in an area which has been expressly 
preempted by Title 40 of the Idaho Code and Title 39, Chapter 49 of the Idaho Administrative 
Code. According to Arthur, Envirosafe, and Caesar, supra, since the Ordinance is an attempt by 
the City to act in an area which is expressly preempted by the Legislature, the ordinance is null 
and void. Therefore, the provision in the development agreement whereby Wylie is bound by all 
existing ordinances does not apply to the Ordinance, because its status as void means it has no 
force or effect oflaw. 
3. Municipal corporations have no control over roadways in Ada County 
Chapter 14, Article 40 ofthe Idaho Code governs the creation of a single county-wide 
highway district. ACHD is the only single county-wide highway district in Idaho. 
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I. C. § 40-1406 governs the powers and duties of a single county-wide highway district 
and provides in relevant part: 
40-1406. Powers and duties of highway commissioners - One highway 
district in county - Highway powers of cities in county abolished - Laws in 
conflict superseded. - The highway commissioners of a county-wide highway 
district shall exercise all of the powers and duties provided in chapter 13 ofthis 
title, and are empowered to make highway ad valorem tax levies as provided by 
chapter 8, of this title. Only one (1) county-wide highway district shall be 
operative within a county where the electorate has voted affirmatively for the 
formation of a county-wide highway district. The district shall specifically be 
responsible for all county secondary and city highways and is hereby 
recognized as a body politic of this state. No city included within a county-wide 
highway district shall maintain or supervise any city highways, or levy any 
ad valorem taxes for the construction, repair or maintenance of city 
highways. No highway district included within a county-wide highway district, 
shall maintain any secondary highways or levy any ad valorem taxes for the 
construction, repair or maintenance of highways. Wherever any provisions of 
the existing laws of the state of Idaho are in conflict with the provisions of 
this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control and supersede all 
such laws. However, within the limits of any city, the city may expend city funds 
for the placement, care and removal oftrees, shrubs, grass, and other plants, 
which are located within the right-of-way of any highway of the county-wide 
highway district. . " (emphasis added). 
I. C. § 40-1310(1) provides that: 
"[T]he commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and 
jurisdiction over all highways and public right-of-way within their highway system, with 
full power to construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and improve all highways 
within their highway system." (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, I.e. § 40-1310(8) reads: 
The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive general 
supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and public rights -
of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish design standards, 
establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish regulations in accordance 
with the provisions oftitle 49, Idaho Code, and control access to said public 
highways, public streets and public rights-of-way. (emphasis added). 
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Thus the City has no statutory authority to control access to public streets, highways 
and/or rights-of-way or dictate access to any roadway in Ada County. 
i) If local control over state highways has not been expressly preempted, then it 
has been impliedly preempted 
If the foregoing provisions of the Idaho Code and Idaho Administrative Code, are found 
not to expressly preempt local control over the state highway system, there is ample evidence 
indicating implied field preemption. According to Caesar, supra, a state statute which relates to 
something governmental or public in nature is deemed to be of state concern, as opposed to local 
concern, and when this is coupled with systematic and/or pervasive regulation in that area it is 
presumed that the Legislature intended to occupy the field. See also Envirosafe, supra. Issues 
which are of "statewide" concern are not local in their nature. See Caesar, supra. 
The ability to control access is public, governmental and statewide in nature because 
access to the state highway systems affects all travelers in the State ofIdaho. This is supported 
by the fact that Title 40 of the Idaho Code delineates between highways of statewide importance 
and those o flo cal importance. Title 40 also defmes and distinguishes the various highway 
systems, whereby the Legislature has indicated when local ordinances regulate roadways and 
when only the State can control roadways. This pervasive and systematic regulation indicates 
that the Legislature intended to designate how and by what entity access to the state highway 
system can be controlled. 
A declaration that the Ordinance was preempted and therefore void would have the same 
effect as saying it never became part of the development agreement between the City and Wylie. 
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The clause of the agreement which allegedly requires Wylie to adhere to the Ordinance is as 
follows: 
5. CONDITIONS GOVERNING DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT PROPERTY: 
5.1. "Developer" and/or "Owner" shall develop the "Property" in accordance 
with the following special conditions: 
5.1.2 That all future development of the subject property shall be 
constructed in accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the 
time of the development. (emphasis added). 
Since a void law is deemed to have no legal effect, declaring the Ordinance void would mean 
Wylie was not bound by the ordinance and therefore not prevented by the City from seeking 
access to SH 20/26. 
D. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES PURPOTING TO CONTROL ACCESS TO 
STATE HIGHWAYS ARE ULTRA VIRES 
1. Ultra vires acts are void, and equity will not uphold them 
A municipal corporation may only exercise those powers granted to it by the State 
Constitution or the Legislature. Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136, 142, 795 P.2d 298, 
304 (1990). "All the powers of a municipal corporation are derived from law and its charter, and 
no ordinance can enlarge, diminish, or vary its powers. Acts beyond the scope of the powers 
conferred on a municipality are 'ultra vires' and are void." 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Etc. § 180. Those powers granted to cities may be: 1) powers granted in express 
words; 2) powers fairly implied in or incident to those powers expressly granted; or 3) powers 
essential to the accomplishment ofthe declared objects and purposes ofthe corporation. Black v. 
Young, 122 Idaho 302, 310, 834 P.2d 304, 309 (1992), citing 0 'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 
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Idaho 313, 320, 303 P.2d 672 (1956). A law of general application is, among other things, an act 
of the state legislature. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375, 399 P.2d 955,960 (1965). 
An ultra vires act is one carried out by an entity that is beyond the scope of its authority. 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The Supreme Court ofIdaho has recognized a distinction 
between void and voidable ultra vires acts. Village of Heyburn v. Security Savings and Trust 
Co., 55 Idaho 732, 751, 49 P.2d 258,267 (1935). Voidable acts arise when a governmental 
entity exercises an authorized power in a manner that violates a procedural rule. Id. Void acts 
are those which are "directly prohibited by some statutory or constitutional enactment" and are 
therefore void. Id. The legal effect of an act deemed 'ultra vires' is, by virtue ofthe Idaho 
Constitution, null and void with no legal effect or force oflaw. Black, 122 Idaho at 318 ("That 
which is void is of no legal effect, or more simply, it isn't there"). Equity will not uphold an 
ultra vires act. Village of Heyburn, 55 Idaho at 752-53, 49 P.2d at 267. 
2. The Local Land Use Planning Act does not grant cities control over 
state highways 
There is no statutory authority or case law in Idaho which requires lTD to follow the 
access control recommendations of a city. The relevant statute reads in relevant parts: 
67-6508. Planning duties. - It shall be the duty of the planning or planning and 
zoning commission to conduct a comprehensive planning process designed to 
prepare, implement, and review and update a comprehensive plan, hereafter 
referred to as the plan. The plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of 
the governing board. The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions, 
trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for each 
planning component. The plan with maps, charts, and reports shall be based on 
the following components as they may apply to land use regulations and actions 
unless the plan specifies reasons why a particular component is unneeded. 
(emphasis added). 
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(i) Transportation - An analysis, prepared in coordination with the local 
jurisdictions(s) having authority over the public highways and streets, 
showing the general locations and widths of a system of major traffic 
thoroughfares and other traffic ways, and of streets and the recommended 
treatment thereof. This component may also make recommendations 
on ... control of access.... (emphasis added). 
The purpose of this statute is merely to require the City's planning department to create a 
comprehensive plan for its jurisdiction. The provision requires that the City'S planning 
commission take the identified components into consideration, but does not confer to the City 
joint authority to control public highways and streets which are under the jurisdiction of other 
government entities. 
In Idaho, it is firmly established that a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally a 
controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies 
responsible for making zoning decisions. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the role of 
comprehensive plans in the context of zoning in Urrutia v. Blaine County, l34 Idaho 353, 537-
58, 2 P.3d 738, 742-43 (2000), as follows: 
A comprehensive plan reflects the 'desirable goals and objectives, or desirable 
future situations' for the land within the jurisdiction. I.e. § 67-6508. This Court 
has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling 
zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies 
responsible for making zoning decisions. (citations omitted) The Board may, 
therefore, refer to the comprehensive plan as a general guide in instances 
involving zoning decisions such as revising or adopting a zoning ordinance. A 
zoning ordinance, by contrast, reflects the permitted uses allowed for various 
parcels within the jurisdiction. See I.C. § 67-6511. (emphasis added). 
I.C. § 67-6508 only mandates that the City create a non-legally binding comprehensive 
plan reflecting desirable goals and objectives in the present and future, and that the components 
outlined be taken into consideration in creating the plan. The provision does not authorize or 
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provide the City with the authority to adopt ordinances involving control of streets and public 
highways which are under the authority of other government entities. I.C. § 67-6508 does not 
provide the City a statutory basis to control access to the state highway system; it merely enables 
the City to make unenforceable access recommendations to lTD. 
3. The Local Land Use Planning Act expressly precludes local control over 
state highways 
lTD's expressly granted authority over state highways supersedes the legislative grant of 
authority to municipalities and counties to regulate local land use planning. I.C. § 67-6501, et 
seq. Cities and counties have the exclusive authority to plan, control and regulate the zoning and 
use of property within their jurisdiction. However, despite the grant of authority to cities and 
counties to regulate the land use within its borders, the Legislature enacted an exception to this 
authority as it applies to lTD. I.e. § 67-6528 states in pertinent part: 
Applicability of ordinances. - The state of Idaho, and all its agencies, boards, 
departments, institutions, and local special purpose districts, shall comply with all 
plans and ordinances adopted under this chapter unless otherwise provided by 
law. In adoption and implementation of the plan and ordinances, the governing 
board or commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the state of 
Idaho and all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special purpose 
districts. The provisions of plans and ordinances enacted pursuant to this chapter 
shall not apply to transportation systems of statewide importance as may be 
determined by the Idaho transportation board .... (emphasis added). 
This exception is of great importance and significance to lTD. lTD's Board, under its 
rule-making authority prescribed under I. e. § 40-312, enacted and adopted a specific rule and 
regulation acknowledging and interpreting this limitation the land use authority of cities and 
counties to state highways: 
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001. TITLE AND SCOPE. - [ ... J The intent of this legislative provision is to 
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide 
importance. [ ... J, IDAPA § 39.03.48.001. 
In Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App.1991), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that lTD could not delegate its legislatively granted authority, 
expressly provided by statute, absent a clearly manifested expression to the contrary in order to 
escape liability. Even though the facts and circumstances involved in Roberts are not on point, 
the Court of Appeals interpretation of the express statutory duties and responsibilities oflTD 
plainly acknowledges that it is exclusive and cannot be delegated to other government agencies. 
The Legislature has provided no grant of authority to the City to pass ordinances which 
purport to control access to state highways, including SH 20/26. Furthermore, the Legislature 
has expressly and unambiguously conferred exclusive authority over state highways to ITD?O 
Since the Ordinance was enacted without any statutory authorization, it is ultra vires. In 
accordance with Alpert, Black, and Village of Heyburn, it was not an act which suffered from 
procedural inftrmity, making it voidable. The Ordinance was enacted without any statutory 
authorization and is therefore void and never had any legal affect. 
The District Court held that the development agreement is not ultra vires, because: 1) the 
agreement was not signed by lTD, therefore it does not bind lTD; 2) the agreement does not limit 
lTD's authority to grant access permits; and 3) the agreement is not against public policy.31 
30 This analysis one. § 67-6528 directly applies to the both the doctrine of field preemption and ultra vires, in that 
the Idaho Legislature expressly precludes local control over the state highway system. It also applies to Wylie's 
ultra vires argument, in that it evinces a lack of authority to act in manner whereby the City can control access to the 
state highway system. 
31 R., Vol. III, p. 471. 
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The tenns of the development agreement are ultra vires because the City has no 
legislative power to control access to state highways, but through the Ordinance, it has control 
over access to state highways because the Ordinance requires all abutting property owners to 
forebear their access rights. Even in instances where lTD grants an access permit to a property 
owner, the City can use the development agreements to preclude the owners from exercising 
their access rights. 
Even though lTD is not bound by the contracts or the Ordinance, all property owners are 
bound, and through agreements that lTD did not sign, the City can control access to state 
highways even when lTD issues an access permit. The fact that lTD is not a party to these 
agreements is the very reason why they are ultra vires?2 
E. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ACCESS TO STATE HIGHWAY 20/26 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act and 
implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or 
advantage which the party might at the party's option have demanded and insisted upon. Crouch 
v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364,368,304 P.2d 646,649 (1956). See also, Stoddard v. Hagadone 
Corp., 147 Idaho 186,191,207 P.3d 162,167 (2009). 
intent. 
Waiver cannot be found unless the party waiving a right unequivocally indicates such 
The question of waiver is mainly a question of intention, which lies at the foundation of 
the doctrine. Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and to operate as 
such it must in all cases be intentional. There can be no waiver unless so intended by one 
party and so understood by the other, or one party has so acted as to mislead the other and 
32 The public policy issue is dealt with below. 
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is estopped thereby. (citations omitted). City of Coeur d'Alene v. Spokane &1.E.R. Co., 
31 Idaho 160, 166, 169 P. 930,931 (1917) 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order cites the following language to 
support the proposition that Wylie's predecessor in interest contractually waived the right to seek 
access from the Subdivision to SH 20/26. 
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 20-
26) but it is not proposing direct access to that facility. 33 
The Court held that the preceding language functioned as an unambiguous commitment to never 
seek direct access from the Subdivision to SH 20/26. The Court held that Wylie's predecessor in 
interest contractually waived the right to ever seek direct access to SH 20/26. 
Even if the language in the agreement was given its full effect, it merely indicates that 
Wylie's predecessor in interest was not requesting direct access to SH 20/26 at the time the 
development agreement was executed. There is no indication that Wylie's predecessor in 
interest agreed not to seek access in the future. In fact, the language in question did not appear 
in the actual body of the agreement. According to the Court: 
33 
34 
By its terms, the agreement incorporates the City of Meridian Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order for the city council hearing of May 9,2009. 
See Development Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 2 sec. 1.7. The City of Meridian Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order p. 3 sec. F. The included staff report 
provides: "The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State 
Highway 20-26) but it is not proposing direct access to that facility. 34 
R, Vol. III, p. 470. 
R, Vol. III, p. 470. 
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The statement contained in the Staff Report does not constitute a promise made by 
Wylie's predecessor in interest which was the result of the bargaining process.35 
The development agreement which Wylie's predecessor in interest signed references the 
City's Findings of Fact, which references a Staff Report, wherein the City's staff indicated that 
Wylie's predecessor in interest had not sought direct access to SH 20/26. A staff report, by its 
very nature, is a descriptive document explaining the factual background relating to the property 
subject to the agreement. The statement does not contain evidence of any intent to prevent a 
party from seeking access in the future, nor does it contain evidence promises were made by the 
property owner to forgo actions in the future. There is simply no evidence in the record that 
Wylie's predecessor in interest entered into any agreement or made any promise never to seek 
access to SH 20/26. The Staff Report only indicated that at the time the agreement was entered, 
Wylie's predecessor in interest had not applied to lTD for direct access to SH 20126 and did not, 
at that time, propose direct access to the highway. 
The clause relied upon does not even use the words waiver or forbear, and it evinces no 
future intent to forgo seeking access. Furthermore, since the record is entirely bereft of any 
agreement or statement of Wylie's predecessor in interest agreeing to give up the right to seek 
direct access to SH 20/26 in the future, summary judgment was not appropriate. At a minimum, 
evidence should be adduced to establish a waiver or demonstrate that there was no waiver. 
35 If deemed a ternl of the contract, the implied waiver contained in the Staff Report would fail for lack of 
consideration. See Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,81,437 P.2d 32, 34 (1968) ("Mere forbearance without any 
request to forbear, or circumstances from which an agreement of forbear [sic] may be implied, is not a consideration 
which will support a promise") (citation omitted). 
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According to Crouch, Spokane & I.E.R. Co, and Stoddard, waiver must be established by 
an unequivocal act where it can be inferred that both parties agreed to waive a right. The 
language used by the District Court to fmd waiver does not indicate that either party understood 
the agreement to precluded Wylie's predecessor in interest from seeking direct access to 
Highway 20126 in the future. The language only passively indicates that at the time the Staff 
Report was written direct, access was not being proposed. 
At a minimum, the facts in the record on the point of waiver are so bare that they should 
be construed in Wylie's favor, since the City sought summary judgment. On remand the Court 
could consider factual evidence to determine whether a waiver occurred or not. 
F. THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER CANNOT BE UNTILIZED BY THE CITY TO 
CIRCUMVENT THE STATE'S CONTROL OVER THE STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM 
1. The doctrine of field preemption cannot be contractually waived 
When a waiver of a public right is contained in a contract that was entered into based 
solely on an ordinance which is later found to be void under the doctrine offield preemption, the 
specific contractual provision containing the waiver is also void. 
Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006), is both legally and 
factually on point. In that case, the City of Seattle entered into two contracts with Olympic Pipe 
Line Co., whereby the latter was to provide Seattle safety oversight of a hazardous liquid 
pipeline located within Seattle's boundaries. After a section of the pipeline burst, killing three 
people, Seattle declined to renew the contracts unless Olympic Pipe complied with a list of 
Seattle's safety demands. 
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Olympic Pipe declined to adhere to Seattle's list of safety requirements, and filed suit for 
injunction and declaratory relief, asserting that even though the franchise agreement between 
Olympic Pipe and Seattle included safety provisions, those provisions where preempted by a 
federal law commonly referred to as the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of2002 ("PSA"), 49 
U.S.C. § 60101 et seq. The District court ruled in favor of Olympic Pipe and Seattle appealed 
the issue to the Ninth Circuit. 
On appeal, Seattle argued that Olympic waived its right to argue that the safety 
regulations are preempted when it entered into the contracts at issue. The Ninth Circuit ruled: 
Seattle contends that, by entering into these agreements, Olympic knowingly and 
voluntarily consented to the City's regulations and waived its right to argue that the 
regulations are preempted by the PSA. 
We reject Seattle's assertion that Olympic ''waived'' its right to advance a preemption 
argument. Federal preemption is the allocation of power and decision-making authority 
between the federal government and the state and local governments, based on the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,22 U.S. 1,211, 
6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (stating that federal supremacy demands that state laws that "interfere 
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress ... must yield"). Preemption is a power of 
the federal government, not an individual right of a third party that the party can ''waive.'' 
Olympic could not, therefore, waive a right that it did not possess. Olympic Pipe Line, 
437 F.3d at 882-83. 
Ifthis Court concludes that the agreement contains a valid waiver ofthe right to seek 
direct access to SH 20126, then, in accordance with Olympic Pipe Line, the waiver is void, 
because the law of contracts cannot be used to circumvent field preemption. Preemption is the 
power of the State ofIdaho, and not an individual right ofa third party. Therefore, the waivers 
in the agreement are not enforceable. 
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2. The doctrine of ultra vires cannot be contractually waived 
Ultra vires acts cannot be ratified by a municipal corporation subsequent to their passage. 
Benjamin Horn v. Mayor and city Council of Baltimore, 30 Md. 218, 1869 WL 3417, at 3 (Md. 
1869); See also, City of Unionville v. Martin, 95 Mo.App. 28, 68 S.W. 605, 607 (1902) (It is well 
settled law that municipal corporations cannot ratity unauthorized acts that are not within the 
scope of their general powers); Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 6A § 31.05[3][f], at 40, 3rd ed. 
("A municipal corporation cannot ratify an act for which it lacked authority, though, nor may it 
ratify an act performed under a law that has been declared void"); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Etc. § 460 ( ... "[A] contract cannot be ratified when a municipal corporation has no 
original power to enter into it, or when the contract is invalid because it is a violation oflaw"); 
State v. Baltimore City Dept. of Rec. and Parks, 166 Md.App. 33,43, 887 A.2d 64, 70 (2005) 
("The rule is equally rigid regarding allegations of contract ratification by the municipality. 
'Ratification of a void contract may occur only ifthe authority empowered by charter or statute 
to make the contract subsequently performs the prescribed acts of authorization"') (citations 
omitted). 
If a contract with a municipal corporation is void, no subsequent agreement or consent 
judgment can validate the void provision. State v. Baltimore City Dept. of Rec. and Parks, 166 
Md.App. 33, 47, 887 A.2d 64,72 (2005) " ... [T]he consent judgment here is void and 
unenforceable, because it is based on the ultra vires settlement agreement between the 
Commission and the City. 'To hold otherwise would be to insulate [illegal] municipal contracts 
from review ... '" (citations omitted) ( emphasis in original). 
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thus dedicated to the irrigation of lands within the district could not be supplied to lands outside 
of the district so long as it was needed for the proper irrigation of lands within the district. 
Finding it significant that to hold otherwise could defeat the will ofthe legislature that the water 
remain within the control and jurisdiction of the district, the Court again held that a government 
entity cannot accomplish by contract what it cannot do by law: "a contract, which would obligate 
an irrigation district to deliver water for use outside the district is ultra vires and void, and that 
estoppel cannot be invoked in aid of such a contract." Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
Black, supra, is also on point. In Black, the family purchased part of a block in the City 
of Ketchum, Idaho. The Black's parcel was bisected by an alley. The Blacks intended to 
purchase a hotel on the property and subsequently applied to the Ketchum Planning and Zoning 
Commission for vacation of the portion ofthe alley that ran through their parcel. 
Various zoning meetings were held and an agreement between the Blacks and the City of 
Ketchum was memorialized by Ordinance Number 471. One of the terms of this agreement gave 
the City of Ketchum a right ofreversion ifthe Blacks were unable to obtain a certificate of 
occupancy by a certain date. On the same day that Ordinance 471 was passed, the Blacks signed 
an estoppel affidavit which provided that the conditions of the ordinance were acceptable and the 
Blacks would not challenge the conditions. The Blacks later submitted a new development plan, 
which was subsequently rejected by the City of Ketchum. In response to the City'S rejection, the 
Blacks filed a complaint alleging that the requirement they sign the estoppel affidavit and the 
right 0 f reversion were both ultra vires acts. 
On appeal from the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that these two conditions 
to the ordinance were ultra vires based on an interpretation ofI.C. § 50-311, which provides the 
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method for municipal corporations to follow in the process of vacating alleys. In applying the 
rules from 0 'Bryant and Alpert, supra, the Supreme Court held as follows: 
The two conditions that the City of Ketchum imposed upon vacation of the alley, as well 
as the right of reversion should a certificate of occupancy not be issued, are not expressly 
granted powers, fairly implied powers from the clear language ofI.C. § 50-311, nor are 
they powers essential to the vacation of the alley. The only condition that I.C. § 50-311 
allows upon a finding of expedience for the public good is that the vacation cannot impair 
"the right of way, easements and franchise rights of any lot owner or public utility." I.C. 
§ 50-311. Thus, the two above-listed conditions, as well as the right of reversion, are 
ultra vires acts by the City of Ketchum because they conflict with I.C. § 50-311. Black at 
31 0 (citation omitted). 
Since the conditions imposed by the City of Ketchum were not acts which the City was 
authorized to engage in, they were deemed null and void as ultra vires. It is important to note 
that the Blacks signed an estoppel affidavit, which is an agreement whereby they agreed they 
would not contest the conditions contained in the ordinance. Despite the Blacks' express 
agreement, the Court did not raise [md issue ofwaiver, ratification, or estoppel. The inference 
which can be drawn is that ultra vires acts are void, as if they never existed. Therefore, any 
contractual provision entered into on reliance on an ultra vires ordinance cannot function as a 
basis for a claim of waiver because the void provision never becomes part ofthe contract. 
An application of the rules set forth in Lloyd, Jones, and Black to this case leads to the 
conclusion that the agreement, which the City had no power to make, is ultra vires and therefore 
not binding on Wylie. All three cases contained contracts which various government entities had 
no authority to enter into. Even though the equitable doctrine of estoppel was raised in some of 
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the cases, all the contracts at issue were voided. Likewise, any contract whereby the City 
purports to control access to the state highway system is also void. 36 
3. The public policy of uniform access standards to state highways precludes 
waiver 
Whether a contract is against public policy is a question oflaw for the court, to be 
determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 
283, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952). "Public policy may be found and set forth in the constitution or 
in the statutes, or where it is found in neither it is sometimes set forth by judicial decision." Id. 
at 287,840. "A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive its illegality .... " 
Id. at 290, 842. 
The public policy at issue here is not an agreement not to seek access, it is the ability of 
the City to require property owners in annexation agreements to adhere to an ordinance which 
prevents the property owner from seeking access to the state highway system. The effect is that 
the City is controlling access to the state highway system. That violates the public policy 
expressly contained in IDAPA 39.03.48.001 "[ ... ] The intent of this legislative provision is to 
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide importance. 
[ .... J" Allowing the City to control access to the state highway system, would violate the grant of 
authority in this area to the State ofIdaho. 
The strong public policy of uniform control over large projects was echoed by the Ninth 
Circuit in Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006), supra, where 
36 In Black and under I.e. § 50-311 the City of Ketchum had the express grant of statutory authority to abandon 
alleys as long as its decision was supported by a finding that it was in the public good. Even though the City had a 
general grant of power to act in an area, that grant was construed narrowly against dle City of Ketchul11. Here, dle 
City has no grant of statutory authority to control access to the state highway system. 
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after holding that a private party cannot contractually waive their ability to challenge a contracts 
validity under a theory offield preemption, the Court went on to resolve an argument based on 
public policy. Specifically, Seattle argued that "by determining that the City's pipeline safety 
demands are unenforceable, we will encourage Olympic and other pipeline companies to agree to 
future contracts to safety provisions that the companies do not intend to honor." Olympic Pipe 
Line, 437 F.3d at 883. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
We disagree. It is not our function to establish public policy in this area. Rather, Congress 
has selected the applicable public policy. It has chosen, through the express preemption 
provision of the PSA, clearly to preclude Seattle from imposing safety regulations on 
Olympic. 
Moreover, it is not apparent that the City's public policy solution is the best one overall. 
Although a sound public policy might normally discourage companies from entering into 
contracts that they do not intend to honor, that policy concern is more than balanced by 
the superordinate federal need to maintain the PSA's policy of providing national 
uniformity in the establishment and enforcement of hazardous liquid pipeline safety 
regulations. As the court in Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View stated: 
Hazardous liquid pipelines run through 21 states, and presumably through small 
and large plots ofland belonging to vast numbers of persons. Were each of these 
landowners entitled to demand compliance with their own safety standards, the 
clear Congressional goal of a national standard for hazardous liquid pipeline 
safety would be thwarted. 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, we do not fmd the City's public policy argument to be 
persuasive. Olympic Pipe Line, 437 F.3d at 883. 
From the preceding holding two points can be distilled. First, legislative decisions to 
preempt inferior governmental bodies from legislating in a specific field are legislative public 
policy decisions. Second, the need for uniform control over large projects which stretch over 
many jurisdictions is a public policy decision. 
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The declaration by the State that local governments should not control access to the state 
highway system is a public policy decision deserving of judicial deference. Allowing the City to 
enter into contracts which effectively allow local governments to control access to the state 
highway system is in direct contravention of this public policy. 
Furthermore, like the pipelines which run through 21 states, the state highway system 
runs through every county and almost every city in the State ofIdaho. There is a strong public 
policy which demands uniform control over these roadways is administered at the State, rather 
than the local level. 
G. lTD SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING A POSITION WHICH 
CONTRADICTS THAT TAKEN IN PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Loomis v. 
Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). "As stated in Loomis, ... a party litigant cannot 
obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, and thereafter, by repUdiating its 
former allegations or statements, or both, be permitted to attempt a recovery or a right against 
another, arising out ofthe same transaction or subject matter." Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 
1062, 1075,695 P.2d 1201,1214 (1984) citing Loomis at 93-94. See also PHH Mortg. Services 
Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 638, 200 P.3d 1180,1187 (2009) ("Judicial estoppel prohibits 
a party from taking a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a 
subsequent proceeding). 
Judicial estoppel applies when "a litigant, by means of sworn statements, obtains a 
judgment or advantage over another party," Smith v. US.R. V Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 
800, 118 P.3d 127,132 (2005), but "[t]he doctrine in no sense depends upon prejudice to the 
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party invoking it. Upon the contrary it rests solely on public policy which exalts the sanctity of 
the oath." Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1077. 37 The doctrine is intended to prevent a litigant from 
playing fast and loose with the courts and to prevent abuse ofthe judicial process by deliberately 
shifting positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 
153, 937 P.2d 1222,1227 (1997). 
The doctrine of estoppel may be applied in cases involving highway districts. Dalton 
Highway Dist. of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 88 Idaho 556, 561,401 P.2d 813,815 (1965). 
In its oral argument and Memorandum opposing Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
lTD asserted that it does not have exclusive [mal authority over access rights to state highways. 38 
However, it has alleged precisely the opposite in the following instances: 
In Moody v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2004),39 lTD advocated: "lTD has sole 
authority over the grant or denial of access to a state highway.,,4o In support ofthis position, the 
State offered the Court several arguments: 
a) I.e. § 40-310(9) grants lTD "specific authority to regulate, restrict and prohibit 
access to state highways.,,41 
b) "The Local Land Use Planning Act does not provide for state highway 
encroachments. The Act generally divorces itself from state highway issues in two 
respects. First, with respect to the transportation component of comprehensive 
plans and zoning ordinances are limited to "[a]n analysis prepared in coordination 
with the local jurisdiction(s) having authority over the public highways and 
streets". Idaho Code, Section 67-6508. Obviously lTD is not a local jurisdiction, 
37 See also Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 900, 204 P.3d 532, 540 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The policies 
underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of orderly administration of justice and regard for the 
dignity of judicial proceedings"). 
38 Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 16 to 24 
39Moody v. Idaho Transportation Dept., In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho In 
and For the County of Ada, Case No.: CV-OC-0509501. R, Vol. II, pp. 351-383. 
40 R, Vol. II, p. 364. 
41 R, Vol. II, p. 365. 
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and thus, any transportation component of a comprehensive plan or zoning 
ordinance would be limited to local roads. 
"Second is the counterpart to above, and that is Idaho Code, Section 67 -6528 
provides: 
'The provisions of plans and ordinances enacted pursuant to this chapter 
shall not apply to transportation systems of statewide importance as may 
be determined by the Idaho transportation board.' 
"In 1989, lTD adopted IDAPA 39.03.48 which interpreted this section of the code 
with, ''The intent of this legislative provision is to prevent local control over 
improvements to transportation systems 0 f statewide importance." IDAP A 
39.03.48.00l. The rule goes on to provide that all sections of state highways are 
transportation systems of statewide importance, and that lTD supports local 
ordinances that "are beneficial to the state highway system." IDAPA 
39.03.48.200.42 
In Willowbrook Development v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2007),43 an administrative 
hearing, lTD took the position that pursuant to legislative mandate, as of August 2001, "the 
Idaho Transportation Board unequivocally said that it had the authority to set the current access 
control requirements of all segments of the state highway system .... ,,44 The hearing officer in 
Willowbrook therefore submitted his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Recommended 
Order wherein the hearing officer held: "The Idaho Transportation Board has clear authority 
from the Idaho legislature to control encroachments within or onto the State Highway System 
right-of-ways.,,45 That reason was among those relied upon by the hearing officer in support of 
his recommendation to the Director that Willowbrook Development be denied its variance 
request.46 In accordance, a fmal order was issued pursuant thereto.
47 
42 R., Vol. II, pp. 365-66. 
43 Willowbrook Development v. Idaho Transportation Dept., BEFORE THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT. R., Vol. II, p. 394 through R. Vol. III, p. 414. 
44 R., Vol. III, p. 413. 
45 R., Vol. III, p. 418. 
46 R., Vol. III, p. 427 
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City of Eagle v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2004),48 was an administrative hearing 
before ITD, where lTD took the position that it had sole authority to deny the City of Eagle' s 
application to build an intersection under lTD's contro1.49 Therefore, Judge McKee issued his 
Decision and Order on Appeal, holding "For the reasons stated in open court on May 17, 2004, 
this Court fmds that the Idaho Transportation board had the proper authority and was within its 
discretion in denying the Petitioners a right-of-way encroachment permit for an intersection on 
the Eagle Alternative. ,,50 
lTD should be judicially estopped from arguing contrary positions. In previous litigation, 
lTD argued that it enjoys sole access control over state highways to the exclusion oflocal 
authorities. It obtained judgment over those local authorities as well as private landowners 
seeking access rights to state highways. In the hearing below, lTD contended that it does not 
enjoy sole access control over state highways. 51 This position is in direct opposition to that 
which lTD has taken in Moody, Willowbrook Development, and City of Eagle, supra. 
The policies of orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial 
proceedings underlying judicial estoppel are applicable in this case. By taking one position in 
previous proceedings and another in the current proceeding, lTD's conduct is a direct affront to 
judicial fairness. 
47 R, Vol. III, pp. 431-51. 
48 City of Eagle v. Idaho Transportation Dept., In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho In and For the County of Ada, Case No.: CV-OC-0302129D (2004). R, Vol. III, pp. 453-64. 
49 R, Vol. III, pp. 453-63. 
50 R Vol. III, p. 465-466. 
51 See Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 10 through p. 35, L. 11. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The right of access is a constitutionally protected property right which cannot be 
interfered with by a governmental entity lightly or without authority. In the context of state 
highways, the power to regulate access rights been exclusively allocated to lTD. lTD and 
ACHD are the only two entities with the power to regulate access in Ada County. Despite this, 
the City of Meridian enacted an ordinance which bars all access to state highways from 
properties located within the city limits. In taking this action, the City has deprived Wylie of a 
protected property right with no authority to do so. Instead of fulfilling its statutory duty to 
control access to state highways, lTD has abdicated its duty and contradicted its previous 
position by advocating that the City can control state highways. The reason may be that the City 
Ordinance was expressly designed to serve and assist ITD by making right of way more 
affordable along state highways. This violates the constitutional protections for both property 
rights, including access and just compensation in the event of a taking to widen the highway. 
The District Court, on a record virtually bereft of evidence that Wylie's predecessor has 
contractually waived his right to seek access, summarily ruled in favor of the City. The District 
Court framed the issue as Wylie's individual ability to seek access, but the real issue is the City's 
ability to circumvent the Idaho Code through either the Ordinance or the law of contracts. 
When a municipal government enacts an ordinance without any authorization and in 
contravention of the Idaho Code, it is void. It cannot be resurrected through the law of contracts. 
The District Court's position that the development agreement does not bind lTD because lTD did 
not sign the agreement illustrates the problem. Through development agreements, the City has 
taken control over access to state highways, which there is no legislative basis to allow. ITD is 
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the sole body with the power to regulate access to the state highway system. lfITD wants to 
regulate Wylie's access rights or deny access, it can, but the City cannot. Wylie deserves to have 
the entity with authority regulate his rights, not a third party. 
The City's actions are contrary to several public policies. There is a strong public policy 
for uniform control over state highways, stated by the Legislature when it expressly preempted 
the field. Another public policy is based on ultra vires, and the concept that our society is 
fundamentally based on the rule of law. Government power is granted by the people to the State. 
The government can only act within the scope of its grant of power. Further, it would be bad 
public policy to allow the City to depress real estate values and prevent access to preserve 
corridors for lTD, making land less expensive to acquire through condemnation. 
The City'S ordinance relating to access to state highways should be held void and of no 
force or effect. The City's attempt to control access runs contrary to the notion oflimited 
government, and particularly offends the concept ofprivate property rights in light of the City's 
goal to benefit the State in future condemnation cases. These precepts are at the very core of our 
constitutional system of government. 
Therefore, Wylie requests this Court reverse the lower Court's summary judgment based 
upon waiver and rule that Meridian City Ordinance 051171 is void on the grounds offield 
preemption and ultra vires and directing that a judgment be entered in Wylie's favor. 
By enacting the Ordinance and executing the development agreement, the City has 
ignored the will ofthe Idaho Legislature, usurped the power ofITD, and ITD has aided the City 
in this endeavor. Through this concerted effort, Wylie has lost his constitutionally protected 
property right of access, and asks this COUlt to correct that wrong. 
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DATED this 10th day ofJune, 2010. 
By __________________ ~~~-----­
E DON COPPLE, ofthe firm 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of June, 2010 a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Karl D. Vogt 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3 311 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
William Nary 
Meridian City Attorney 
33 E. Idaho Ave. 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAIytH~.f.~~DF"·-·------·-· 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O~l~' X i i!U09 
J. DA \I.~ '. r ,.~lrl<'. 
8y - ._- I cr "' I -.- 1'··----· .. -
JAMES R. WYLIE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, and 
THE CITY OF MERIDIAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0908647 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This is an action for declaratory judgment. In his Second Amended Complaint filed May 15, 
2009, Plaintiff James R. Wylie seeks a declaration from this Court that the Idaho Transportatio 
Department, hereinafter lTD, has exclusive jurisdiction over State Highway 20/26 and controls acces 
to that highway from Plaintiffs property which is adjacent to it. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratio 
from this Court that the City of Meridian has no jurisdiction or control over access to State Highwa 
20126 and its City Ordinance 05-1171 is therefore void. On June 8, 2009, Defendant City 0 
Meridian, hereinafter City, filed Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Secon 
Amended Complaint, Affidavit of Tara Green in Support of Defendant City of Meridian's Motion t 
Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Affidavit of Jaycee Holman in Support of Defendan 
City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, and Memorandum i 
Support of Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. 
The City sought dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(I) an 
12(b)(6). On June 22, 2009, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed as was the Affidavi 
of E Don Copple in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of James R. Wylie i 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summar 
Judgment. On July 17, 2009, Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, hereinafter th 
Transportation Board, filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summar 
Judgment, Affidavit of Steven M. Parry in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Affidavit of Brent Jennings, P.E., Highway Operations an 



























Safety Engineer. There followed a series of reply briefs, memoranda, and affidavits from the partie 
to these motions that the Court will not list here. However, the City did begin referring to its motio 
as one for summary judgment apparent1y because of the numerous affidavits both in support of an 
opposition to the City's motion which had not been excluded. See I.R.C.P. l2(b). On July 20, 2009 
Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wylie in Support 0 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendant City 0 
Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wy1ie in Support of Plaintiffs Motio 
for Summary Judgment were also filed. On July 24, 2009, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition t 
City of Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wylie was filed. Hearing 0 
these motions was held on September 28, 2009. At that time, the Court found the City's motion t 
strike was moot because the portions of the affidavit involved were not related to any issue currentl 
before the Court. The Court took the cross-motions for summary judgment under advisement. 
The following facts are not in dispute. The case concerns the property known as Knighthil 
Center Subdivision, located on the southwest corner of Chinden Boulevard and Linder Road i 
Meridian, Idaho. Chinden Boulevard is also known as State Highway 20/26 and will hereinafter b 
referred to as SH 20/26. The Plaintiff s predecessor in interest entered into a development agreemen 
for Knighthill Center Subdivision on July 18,2006 with the developer and the City. This agreement i 
attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Jaycee Holman in Support of Defendant City of Meridian' 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Summary Judgment i 
Favor of Defendant City of Meridian filed on July 20, 2009. This agreement set forth the condition 
of the annexation and zoning of the subdivision. The agreement does not provide for direct traffi 
access to or from SH 20/26; but rather uses alternative points for ingress and egress. This documen 
was recorded against the property on July 31, 2006. Plaintiff filed an application to modify th 
development agreement and for a preliminary plat. The applications were approved by the Meridia 
City Council on August 26, 2008. However, at that time the Plaintiff did not request direct access t 
SH 20/26. On February 24, 2009 the Plaintiff filed an application for a variance from the Unifie 
Development Code, Meridian City Code § ll-3H-4(b), which limits points of access to stat 
highways, and requested direct access to SH 20/26. A hearing was held and the Meridian Cit 
Council denied the variance application on May 5, 2009. The Plaintiff subsequently filed his origina 
complaint in the district court on May 6, 2009. 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as the Plaintiff is challenging the validity 0 
Meridian City Code §11-3H-4(b) and not the denial of the variance itself. See McCuskey v. Canyo 



























County, 123 Idaho 657, 660-661, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). City Ordinance 05-1171 has been codified a 
Meridian City Code §11-3H-l, 2, 3, and 4. 
The cross-motions for summary judgment relate to the aforementioned City ordinance. Th 
City contends the ordinance was properly authorized and has the force and effect of law. Plaintif 
asserts that the City had no authority to create the ordinance which controls access points to stat 
highways and, therefore, should be found ultra vires. 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, affidavits 
and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate n 
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 
Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) (internal citation 
omitted). Ordinarily, the district court is to "construe facts in the existing record in favor of th 
nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonrnovin 
party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Eve 
where the district court will be the trier of fact it "would be required to view conflicting evidentiar 
facts in favor of the [nonmoving party]." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283 
(Ct.App. 1984). However, "where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather tha 
a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment will be appropriate despite the possibility 0 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving those conflictin 
inferences." Riverside Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
"If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains.' 
Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443,445,65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003). 
As mentioned above, the facts are not in dispute in this case. The question therefore become 
whether either party "is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). As was noted earlier, 
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment from this Court that Meridian City Code §11-3H-l, et seq., i 
void because the City was acting outside the scope of its authority by enacting the ordinance. 
However, before this Court can address that claim, it must first address the City'S contention tha 
Plaintiff's claim would resolve neither the uncertainty nor the controversy "giving rise to th 
proceeding." I.C. 10-1206. 
"As a general rule, a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual 0 
justiciable controversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P .2d 988 (1984 
(internal citations omitted). "[T]he United States Supreme Court aptly summarized the pivota 



























elements of a justiciable controversy in Aetna Life Insurance Co. V. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 
461,81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). 
A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial 
determination. . .. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or 
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. .... 
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of 
parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished 
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 
300 U.S. at 240-41,57 S.Ct. at 464 (citations omitted)." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
The aforementioned development agreement binds the developer and owner to the agreement. 
"Owner" is defined as including "any subsequent owner(s) of the 'Property'." Developmen 
Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 3 sec. 3.3. As a result, Plaintiff, as the successor in interest to the property, 
is bound by the agreement. As has been previously noted, the agreement did not include traffic acces 
to and from SH 20126, using instead alternative points for ingress and egress. By its terms, th 
agreement incorporates the City of Meridian Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision 
Order for the city council hearing of May 9, 2009. See Development Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 2 sec. 
1. 7. The City of Meridian Findings of F act, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order includes th 
City of Meridian Planning Department Staff Report for the Hearing Date of May 9, 2006. See City 0 
Meridian Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order p. 3 sec. F. The included staf 
report provides: "The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highwa 
20-26) but is not proposing direct access to that facility." City of Meridian Planning Department Staf 
Report for the Hearing Date of May 9, 2006 p. 4 sec. 6.i. 
"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354,361,93 P.3d 685 (2004) (internal citations omitted). "If a contract's terms ar 
clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are questions oflaw, and the meanin 
of the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the contract's plain words." Taylo 
v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 140, 59 P.3d 308 (2002) (internal citation omitted). " 'The purpose 0 
interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract wa 
entered .... ' Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182,185-186,75 P.3d 743,746-747 (2003 
(internal citations omitted)." Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185,190,108 P.3 
332 (2005). 
The development agreement, including its attached documents, is not ambiguous. It is clea 
from the plain meaning of the terms of this agreement that Plaintiffs predecessor in interest ha 




























committed itself to not seeking direct access to SH 20/26; a commitment that is binding on Plaintiff. 
However, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, this agreement does not constitute an ultra vires attemp 
by the City to circumvent lTD's authority over access to state highways. First of all, lTD is not 
signatory to this agreement and, therefore, would not be bound by its terms. Secondly, the agreemen 
does not limit ITO's authority to grant encroachment permits for access to SH 20/26. See, e.g., lTD' 
Administrative Policy A-12-01; State Highway Access Control. Rather, it merely restricts Plaintiff 
ability to seek such a permit. A similar conclusion was reached when Plaintiffs application for a 
encroachment permit was denied in a letter from ITO's chief engineer, Tom E. Cole, dated March 24 
2009. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Brent Jennings, P.E., Highway Operations and Safety Enginee 
filed on July 17,2009. This Court has been cited to no authority, nor is it aware of any such authority, 
that an agreement by a landowner to forego applying for an encroachment permit contravenes an 
law or public policy thereby constituting illegal consideration. cf Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560 
566-568, 944 P.2d 695 (1997) (noting specific statutory provisions that were violated by a contrac 
where one of the parties, e.g., agreed not to report allegations involving sexual abuse of a child). 
Therefore, the development agreement is enforceable against Plaintiff. 
In order to address Plaintiff s claim for declaratory judgment, this Court would therefor 
have to assume Plaintiffs binding agreement with the City did not exist. This would constitut 
rendering an advisory opinion on a hypothetical set of facts; something which this Court may not do. 
See, again, Harris v. Cassia County, supra, 106 Idaho 516. Because no justiciable controversy exist 
in the case at bar, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he is requesting. 
In consideration of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, havin 
become one for summary judgment, is granted. The City of Meridian is hereby directed to prepare 
form of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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CIlY OF MERIDIAN ORDINANCE NO. _tl_?_-_I_I_7_1 
BY THE CITY COUNCIL: BIRD, DONNELL, ROUNTREE, WARDLE 
AN ORDINANCE ENACTING A NEW PROVISION OF THE UNIFIED 
DEVELOPMENT CODE PERTAINING TO DEVELOPMENT ALONG STATE 
IDGHWAYS TO BE CODIFIED AT TITLE 11, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE H OF 
THE MERIDIAN CITY CODE; ADDING A NEW DEFINITION OF THE TERM 
"APPROACH" TO TITLE 11, CHAPTER 1, ARTICLE A, SECTION 1 OF THE 
MERIDIAN CIlY CODE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS, on the ,Joe day of ~ f- 2005, the Meridian 
City Council approved Ordinance No. &75'- enacting a new Unified 
Development Code, codified at Title 11 of the Meridian City Code; and, 
WHEREAS, the Meridian City Council desires to adopt an additional provision 
of the Unified Development Code pertaining to development along state highways for the 
purposes stated herein. 
NOW, TilEREOFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL 
OF THE CITY OF MERIDIAN, IDAHO: 
Section 1. 
read as follows: 
That a new Title 11, Chapter 3, Article H is hereby enacted and shall 
11-3H-l: PURPOSE: The regulations of this Article are intended to achieve three 
purposes: 1) limit access points to state highways in order to maintain traffic flow and 
provide better circulation and safety within the community and for the traveling public, 2) 
to preserve right-of-way for future highway expansions, and 3) design new residential 
development along state highways to mitigate noise impacts associated with such 
roadways. 
11-3H-2: APPLICABll..ITY: The following standards shall apply to all 
development along state highways, including but not limited to State Highway 69, State 
Highway 55, State Highway 20-26, and Interstate 84. The following standards shall also 
apply to development along McDermott Road from Chinden Boulevard to Interstate 84 as 
the City of Meridian's preferred location for a future highway right-of~way for the State 
Highway 16 extension. If the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) determines an 
alternate location for the State Highway 16 extension, these standards shall apply to the 
lTD determined location. 
11-3H-3: PROCESS: Staff shall review all development applications for 
compliance with these standards. The decision making body may consider and apply 
modifications to the standards of this section upon specific recommendation of the Idaho 
Transportation Department. . 
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11-3H-4: STANDARDS: 
A. Access to 1-84 and McDermott Road (or future Highway 16 extension): no access 
shall be allowed except at specific interchange locations as established by the 
Idaho Transportation Department. 
B. Access to State Highway 69, State Highway 55, and State Highway 20-26: 
1. Use of existing approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that all of the 
following conditions are met: 
a. The existing use is lawful and properly permitted effective :xx [insert date of 
the adoption] 
b. The nature of the use does not change (for example a residential use to a 
commercial use). 
c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an increase in the 
number of residential dwelling units or an increase in the square footage of 
commercial space). 
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity of use, the owner shall 
develop or otherwise acquire access to a street other than the state highway. The 
use of the existing approach shall cease and the approach shall be abandoned 
and removed. 
a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be allowed. 
b. Public street connections to the state highway shall only be allowed at: 
i. the section line road; and 
ii. the half-mile mark between section line roads. These half-mile connecting 
streets shall be collector roads. 
3. The applicant shall construct a street, generally paralleling the state highway, to 
provide future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state 
highway that lie between the applicant's property and the nearest section line 
road and/or half mile collector road. The intent is to provide for future 
connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state highway that lie 
between the applicant's property and the nearest section line road and/or half-
mile collector road. The street shall be designed to collect and distribute traffic. 
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a, The applicant shall be responsible to construct the segment ofthe street within 
the applicant's property. This standard is not intended to require off-site 
improvements. 
b. The street shall meet the road standards of the Ada County Highway District. 
c. The street shall connect to the section line road at a distance that is no closer 
than 660 (as measured from center line to center line) from the intersection 
with the state highway. 
d. The street shall provide buildable lots between the bighway and the collector 
road. For the purposes of this Article, such streets shall be tenned backage 
roads. 
e. Frontage streets or private streets may be considered by the Council at the 
time of property annexation or through the conditional use process. Frontage 
streets and private streets shall be limited to areas where there is sufficient 
acCess to surrounding properties and a public street is not desirable in that 
location. 
C. Design and construction standards for state highways: 
1. The applicant shall have an approved pennit from the Idaho Transportation 
Department for construction of any access to the state highway andlor any 
construction done in the highway right of way. 
2. The width of right-of-way reservations shall be as set forth by the ITD 
3. Along State Highway 55, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a 
ten-foot (10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement=and installing 
streetlights and landscaping consistent with the Eagle Road Corridor Study. 
4. Along Highway 69, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a ten-foot 
(10') multi-use pathway with a public use easement. 
D. Noise abatement for residential uses along state highways: 
1. The applicant shall provide traffic noise abatement by constructing a berm or a 
berm and wall combination approximately parallel to the state highway. 
2. The top of the berm or berm and wall in combination shall be a minimum often 
feet (10') higher than the elevation at the centerline of the state highway. 
3. If a wall is proposed, the wall shall meet the following standards: 
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a. Wall materials shall be impervious concrete or stucco or other appropriate 
sound attenuating material. 
b. Intermittent breaks in the berm or berm and wall in combination will degrade 
the function and shall not be allowed. 
c. The applicant shall not construct a monotonous wall. In order to achieve this 
standard, the applicant may choose one or both of the following variations: 
i. The color andlor texture of the wall shall be varied every 300 linear feet. 
This could include murals or artwork. 
ii. The wall shall be staggered every 300 linear feet subject to Section II-3R-
4D4 above that prohibits breaks in the wall. 
4. The Director may approve alternative compliance as set forth in Chapter 5 
ADMINISTRATION of this Title where the applicant has a substitute noise 
abatement proposal in accord with lTD standards and prepared by a qualified 
sound engineer. 
Section 2. That the following definition shall be added to Title 11, Chapter 1, 
Article A, Section 1: 
ApprOach: an access from a state highway. The access may be a driveway. 
common drive, private street, Qr a commerciaVindustrial drive aisle. 
Section 3. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect on the 15th day of 
September, 2005, after its passage, approval and publication. 
PASSED by the City Council of the City of Meridian, Idaho, this 30~day of 
~+- ,2005. 
APPROVED by the Mayor of the City of Meridian, Idaho, this J.()~ day of 
~'" ,2005. 
APPROVE.~D~: ______ __ 
\ 
£ 
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ARTICLE H. DEVELOPMENT ALONG FEDERAL AND 
STATE HIGHWAYS 
11-3H-1: PURPOSE: 
The regulations of this article are intended to achieve three (3) purposes: a) limit access points 
to state highways in order to maintain traffic flow and provide better circulation and safety 
within the community and for the traveling public, b) to preserve right of way for future highway 
expansions, and c) design new residential development along state highways to mitigate noise 
impacts associated with such roadways. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005) 
11-3H-2: APPLICABILITY: 
The following standards shall apply to all development along state highways, including, but not 
limited to, State Highway 69, State Highway 55, State Highway 20-26, and Interstate 84. The 
following standards shall also apply to development along McDermott Road from Chinden 
Boulevard to Interstate 84 as the city of Meridian's preferred location for a future highway right 
of way for the State Highway 16 extension. If the Idaho transportation department (ITO) 
determines an alternate location forthe State Highway 16 extension, these standards shall 
apply to the ITO determined location. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005) 
11-3H-3: PROCESS: 
Staff shall review all development applications for compliance with these standards. The 
decision making body may consider and apply modifications to the standards of this article 
upon specific recommendation of the Idaho transportation department. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-30-
2005, eff. 9-15-2005) 
11-3H-4: STANDARDS: 
A. Access to and/or from 1-84 and McDermott Road (or future Highway 16 extension): No 
access shall be allowed except at specific interchange locations as established by the 
Idaho transportation department. 
B. Access to and/or from State Highway 6.9, State Highway 55, and State Highway 20-26: 
(Ord. 07-1325, 7-10-2007) 
1. Use of eXisting approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that all of the following 
conditions are met: 
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a. The existing use is lawful and properly permitted effective September 15, 2005. 
b. The nature of the use does not change (for example a residential use to a commercial 
use). 
c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an increase in the number of 
residential dwelling units or an increase in the square footage of commercial space). 
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity of use, the owner shall develop 
or otherwise acquire access to a street other than the state highway, The use of the 
existing approach shall cease and the approach shall be abaQdoned and removed. 
a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be allowed. 
b. Public street connections to the state highway shall only be allowed at: 
(1) The section line road; and 
(2) The half mile mark between section line roads. These half mile connecting streets 
shall be collector roads. 
3. The applicant shall construct a street, generally paralleling the state highway, to provide 
future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state highway that lie between 
the applicant's property and the nearest section line road and/or half mile collector road. 
The intent is to provide for future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the 
state highway that lie between the applicant's property and the nearest section line road 
and/or half mile collector road. The street shall be designed to collect and distribute 
traffic. 
a. The applicant shall be responsible to construct the segment of the street within the 
applicant's property. This standard is not intended to require off site improvements. 
b. The street shall meet the road standards of the Ada County highway district. 
c. The street shall connect to the section line road at a distance that is no closer than six 
hundred sixty (660) (as measured from centerline to centerline) from the intersection 
with the state highway. 
d. The street shall provide buildable lots between the highwayand the collector road. For 
the purposes of this article, such streets shall be termed "backage roads". 
e. Frontage streets or private streets may be considered by the council at the time of 
property annexation or through the conditional use process. Frontage streets and 
private streets shall be limited to areas where there is sufficient access to surrounding 
properties and a public street is not desirable in that location. 
C. Design and construction standards for state highways: 
1. The applicant shall have an approved permit from the Idaho transportation department 
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for construction of any access to the state highway and/or any construction done in the 
highway right of way. 
2. The width of right of way reservations shall be as set forth by the ITO. 
3. Along State Highway 55, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a ten foot 
(10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement and installing streetlights and 
landscaping consistent with the Eagle Road corridor study. (Ord. 05-1171,8-30-2005, 
eff. 9-15-2005) 
4. Along Highway 69 and Highway 20-26, the applicant shall be responsible for 
constructing a ten foot (10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement. (Ord. 07-1325, 
7-10-2007) 
O. Noise abatement for residential uses along state highways: 
1. The applicant shall provide traffic noise abatement by constructing a berm or a berm and 
wall combination approximately parallel to the state highway. 
2. The top of the berm or berm and wall in combination shall be a minimum of ten feet (10') 
higher than the elevation at the centerline of the state highway. 
3. If a wall is proposed, the wall shall meet the following standards: 
a. Wall materials shall be impervious concrete or stucco or other appropriate sound 
attenuating material. 
b. Intermittent breaks in the berm or berm and wall in combination will degrade the 
function and shall not be allowed. 
c. The applicant shall not construct a monotonous wall. In order to achieve this standard, 
the applicant may choose one or both of the following variations: 
(1) The color and/or texture of the wall shall be varied every three hundred (300) linear 
feet. This could include murals or artwork. 
(2) The wall shall be staggered every three hundred (300) linear feet subject to 
subsection 03b of this section that prohibits breaks in the wall. 
4. The director may approve alternative compliance as set forth in chapter 5, 
"Administration", of this title where the applicant has a substitute noise abatement 
proposal in accord with ITO standards and prepared by a qualified sound engineer. (Ord. 
05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005) 
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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
PARTIES: 1. City of Meridian 
2. 
3. 
Foothill Knights, LLC, Owner 
Sea 2 Sea, LLC, Developer 
TIllS DEVELOPMENT AGREElMENT (this "Agreement"), is made and 
entered into this £-f6 day of V'""M ~ , 2006, by and between City of Meridian, a 
municipal corporation of the State ofIda~, hereafter cailed "CITY", Sea 2 Sea, LLC, whose 
address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, hereinafter called "DEVELOPER", 
and Foothill Knights, LLC, whose address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, 
hereinafter called "OWNER". 
1. RECITALS: 
1.1 WHEREAS, "Owner" are the sole owners, in law and/or equity, of 
certain tract ofland in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho, described in 
Exhibit A for each owner, which is attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein as if set forth in full, herein after referred 
to as the "Property"; and . 
1.2 WHEREAS, I.C. § 67-6511A, Idaho Code, provides that cities may, by 
ordinance, require or pennit as a condition of re-zoning that the 
"Developer" and/or "Owner" make a written commitment concerning 
the use or development of the subject "Property"; and 
1.3 WHEREAS, "City" has exercised its statutory authority by the 
enactment of the Meridian Unified Development Code, which 
authorizes development agreements upon the annexation and/or re~ 
zoning of land; and 
1.4 WHEREAS, "Developer" has submitted an application for annexation 
and zoning of the "Property's" described in Exhibit A, and has 
requested a designation of (C-G) General Commercial District, 
(Municipal Code of the City of Meridian); and 
1.5 WHEREAS, "Developer" and/or "Owner') made representations at the 
public hearings both before the Meridian Planning & ZQning 
Commission and before the Meridian City Council, as to how the 
subject "Property" will be developed and what improvements will be 
made; and 
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (AZ 06·006) KNIGHTHlLL CENTER SUBDIVISION 




1.6 WHEREAS, record of the proceedings for the requested annexation 
and zoning designation of the subject "PropertY' held before the 
Planning & Zoning Commission, and subsequently before the City 
Council, include responses of government subdivisions providing 
services within the City of Meridian planning jurisdiction, and received 
further testimony and comment; and 
1. 7 WHEREAS, City Council. the 9th day of May, 2006, has approved 
certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision and 
Order, set forth in Exhibit B, which are attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein as if set forth in full, hereinafter referred 
to as (the "Findings"); and . 
1.8 WHEREAS, the Findings require the "Developer" andlor "Owner" to 
enter into a development agreement before the City Council takes final 
action on annexation and zoning designation; and 
1.9 "DEVELOPER" and/or "OWNER" deem it to be in their best 
interest to be able to enter into this Agreement and acknowledges that 
this Agreement was entered into voluntarily and at their urging and 
requests; and 
1.10 WHEREAS, "City" requires the "Developer" andlor "Owner" to enter 
into a development agreement for the purpose of ensuring that the 
"Property" is developed and the subsequent use of the "Property" is in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this development 
agreement, herein being established as a result of evidence received by 
the ~'City" in the proceedings for zoning designation from government 
subdivisions providing services within the planning jurisdiction and 
from affected property owners and to ensure re-zoning designation is in 
accordance with the amended Comprehensive Plan of the City of . 
Meridian adopted August 6, 2002, Resolution No. 02-382, and the 
Zoning and Development Ordinances codified in Meridian City Code 
Title 11 and Title 12. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and conditions set 
forth herein, the parties agree as follows: 
2. INCORPORATION OF REClT ALS: That the above recitals are contractual 
and binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
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3. DEFINITIONS: For all purposes of this Agreement the following words, 
terms, and phrases herein contained in this section shall be defined and interpreted as herein 
provided for, unless the clear context ofthe presentation of the same requires otherwise: 
4. 
3.1 "CITY": means and refers to the City of Meridian, a party to this 
Agreement, which is a municipal Corporation and government 
subdivision of the state of Idaho, organized and existing by virtue of 
law of the State of Idaho, whose address is 33 East Idaho Avenue, 
Meridian, Idaho 83642. 
3.2 "DEVELOPER": means and refers to Sea 2 Sea, LLC, whose address 
is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, the party developing 
said "Property" and shall include any subsequent developer(s) of the 
"Property" . 
3.3 "OWNER":· means and refers to Foothill Knights, LLC, whose 
address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, the party that 
owns said "Property" and shall include any subsequent owner(s) of the 
"Property" . 
3.4 "PROPERTY": means and refers to that certain parcel(s) of 
"Property" located in the County of Ada, City of Meridian as described 
in Exhibit A describing the parcels to be annexed and zoned c-o 
(General Commercial District) attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein as if set forth at length. 
USES PERMITTED BY THIS AGREEMENT: 
4.1 The uses allowed pursuant to this Agreement are only those uses 
allowed under "City's" Zoning Ordinance codified at Meridian City 
Code Section 11 which are herein specified as follows: 
Construction and development of a Certificate o/Zoning Compliance 
shall he submitted to the City of Meridian prior to a future 
development in the C=G zone, and the pertinent provisions of the City 
of Meridian Comprehensive Plan are applicable to this AZ 06~006 
application. 
4.2 No change in the uses specified in this Agreement shall be allowed 
without modification of this Agreement. 
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5. CONDITIONS GOVERNING DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT 
PROPERTY: 
5.1. "Developer" andlor "Owner" shall develop the "Property" in accordance with 
the following special conditions: 
5.1.1 That all future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes, 
materials, equipment and conditions of operation that will be 
detrimental to any persons, property or the general welfare by reason of 
excessive production of traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, glare or odors. 
5.1.2 That all future development of the sUbject property shall be cons1ructed 
in accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of 
the development. 
. 5.1.3 That the applicant be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer 
and water service extension. 
5.1.4 That any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this 
project will have to be removed from their domestic service, per City 
Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available from the City 
of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as 
landscape irrigation. 
5.1.5 That prior to issuance of nay building permit, the subject property shall 
be subdivided in accordance with the City of Meridian Unified 
Development Code. 
5.1.6 That a 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be 
stubbed to the property located at 6175 N. Linder Road. 
5.1.7 That development of the property shall comply substantially with the 
conceptual site plan shown on the preliminary plat dated January 5, 
2006. 
5.1.8 That the applicant shall provide signage which indicates that there is an 
exit towards W. Everest Lane. 
5.1.9 That the applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access 
easement with the development to the west for access to W. Everest 
Lane, which is a private street. 
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6. COMPLIANCE PERIOD/CONSENT TO REZONE: This Agreement and 
the commitments contained herein shall be terminated, and the zoning designation reversed, 
upon a default of the "Developer" andlor "Owner" or "Developers" andlor "Owners" heirs, 
successors, assigns, to comply with Section 6 entitled "Conditions Governing Development of 
Subject Property" of this agreement within two years of the date this Agreement is effective, 
and after the "City" has complied with the notice and hearing procedures as outlined in Idaho 
Code § 67-6509, or any subsequent amendments or recodifications thereof. 
7. CONSENT TO DE-ANNEXATION AND REVERSAL OF 
ZONING DESIGNATION: 
''Developer'' andlor 140wner" consents upon default to the reversal of the 
zoning designation ofthe "Property" subject to and conditioned upon the following conditions 
precedent to-wit: 
7.1 That the "City" provide written notice of any failure to comply with this 
Agreement to "Developer" andlor "Owner and if the "Developer" 
andlor "Owner" fails to cure such failure within six (6) months of such 
notice. 
8. INSPECTION: "Developer" andlor "Owner" shall, immediately upon 
completion of any portion or the entirety of said development of the "Property" as required 
by this agreement or by City ordinance or policy, notifY the City Engineer and request the 
City Engineer's inspections and written approval of such completed improvements or portion 
thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Development Agreement and all . 
other ordinances of the "City" that apply to said Development. 
9. DEFAULT: 
9.1 In the event "Developer" andlor "Owner", or "Developer's" and/or 
"Owner's" heirs, successors, assigns, or subsequent owners of the 
"Property" or any other person acquiring an interest in the "Property", 
fail to faithfully comply with all of the terms and conditions included 
in this Agreement in connection with the "Property", this Agreement 
may be modified or terminated by the "City" upon compliance with 
the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. 
9.2 A waiver by "City" of any default by ''Developer'' andlor "Owner" of 
anyone or more of the covenants or conditions hereof shall apply 
solely to the breach and breaches waived and shaH not bar any other 
rights or remedies of "City" or apply to any subsequent breach of any 
such or other covenants and conditions. 
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10. REQUIREMENT FOR RECORDATION: "City" shall record either a 
memorandum of this Agreement or this Agreement, including all of the Exhibits, at 
"Developer's" and/or "Owner's" cost, and submit proof of such recording to "Developer" 
and/or "Owner", prior to the third reading of the Meridian Zoning Ordinance in connection 
with the re-zoning of the "Property" by the City Council. If for any reason after such 
recordation, the City Council fails to adopt the ordinance in connection with the annexation 
and zoning of the "Property" contemplated hereby, the "City" shall execute and record an 
appropriate instrument of release of this Agreement. 
11. ZONING: "City" shall, following recordation of the duly approved 
Agreement, enact a valid and binding ordinance zoning the "Property" as specified herein. 
12. REMEDIES: This Agreement shall be enforceable in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by either "City" or "Developer" andlor "Owner", or by any successor or 
successors in title or by the assigns of the parties hereto. Enforcement may be sought by an 
appropriate action at law or in equity to secure the specific performance of the covenants, 
agreements, conditions, and obligations contained herein. 
12.1 In the event of a material breach of this Agreement, the parties agree 
that "City" and "Developer" andlor "Owner" shall have thirty (30) 
days after delivery of notice of said breach to correct the same prior to 
the non-breaching party's seeking of any remedy provided for herein; 
provided, however, that in the case of any such default which cannot 
with diligence be cured within such thirty (30) day period, if the 
defaulting party shall commence to cure the same within such thirty 
(30) day period and thereafter shall prosecute the curing of same with 
diligence and continuity, then the time allowed to cure such failure 
may be extended for such period as may be necessary to complete the 
curing of the same with diligence and continuity. . 
12.2 In the event the performance of any covenant to be perfonned 
hereunder by either "Developer" and/or "Owner" or "City" is delayed 
for causes which are beyond the reasonable control of the party 
responsible for such performance, which shall include, without 
limitation, acts of clvil disobedience, strikes or similar causes, the 
time for such performance shall be extended by the amount of time of 
such delay. 
13. SURETY OF PERFORMANCE: The "City" may also require surety 
bonds, irrevocable letters of credit, cash deposits, certified check ot.' negotiable bonds, as 
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which the "Developer" andlor "Owner" agree to provide, if required by the "City". 
14. CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY: The "Developer" andlor "Owner" 
agree that no Certificates of Occupancy will be issued until aU improvements are completed, 
unless the "City" and "Developer" andlor "Owner" has entered into an addendum agreement 
stating when the improvements will be completed in a phased developed; and in any event, 
no Certificates of Occupancy shall be issued in any phase in which the improvements have 
not been installed, completed, and accepted by the "City". 
15. ABIDE BY ALL CITY ORDINANCES: That "Developer" and/or 
"Owner" agree to abide by all ordinances of the City of Meridian and the "Property" shall be 
subject to de-annexation if the owner or his assigns, heirs, or successors shall not meet the 
conditions contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Development 
Agreement, and the Ordinances of the City of Meridian. 
16 NOTICES: Any notice desired by the parties and/or required by this 
Agreement shall be deemed delivered if and when personally delivered or three (3) days after 
deposit in the United States Mail, registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt 
requested, addressed as follows: 
CITY: 
c/o City Engineer 
City of Meridian 
33 E. Idaho Ave. 
Meridian, ID 83642 
OWNER: 
Foothill Knights, LLC 
757 W. Bankside Drive 
Eagle, ID 83616 
with copy to: 
City Clerk 
City of Meridian 
33 E. Idaho Avenue 
Meridian, ID 83642 
DEVELOPER: 
Sea 2 Sea, LLC 
757 W. Bankside Drive 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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16.1 A party shall have the right to change its address by delivering to the 
other party a written notification thereof in accordance with the 
requirements of this section. 
17. ATTORNEY FEES: Should any litigation be commenced between the 
parties hereto concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled, in addition to 
any other relief as may be granted, to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees as 
determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction. This provision shall be deemed to be a 
separate contract between the parties and shall survive any default, tennination or forfeiture 
of this Agreement. 
18. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: The parties hereto acknowledge and agree 
that time is strictly of the essence with respect to each and every term, condition and 
provision hereof, and that the failure to timely perform any of the obligations hereunder shall 
constitute a breach of and a default under this Agreement by the other party so failing to 
perform. 
'19. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS: This Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the parties' respective heirs, successors, assigns and personal 
representatives, including "City's" corporate authorities and their successors in office. This 
Agreement shall be binding on the "Developer" andlor "Owner" of the "Property", each 
subsequent owner and any other person acquiring an interest in the "Property". Nothing 
herein shall in any way prevent sale or alienation of the "Property", or portions thereof, 
except that any sale or alienation shall be subject to the provisions hereof and any successor 
owner or owners shall be both benefited and bound by the conditions and restrictions herein 
expressed. "City" agrees, upon written request of "Developer" and/or "Owner", to execute 
appropriate and recordable evidence of termination of this Agreement if "City", in its sole 
and reasonable discretion, had determined that "Developer" andlor "Owner" has fully 
performed its obligations under this Agreement. 
20. INVALID PROVISION: If any provision oftbis Agreement is held not 
valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such provision shall be deemed to be excised from 
this Agreement and the invalidity thereof shall not affect any of the other provisions 
contained herein. 
21. FINAL AGREEMENT: This Agreement sets forth all promises, 
inducements, agreements, condition and understandings bet\¥een "Developer" andlor 
"Owner" and "City" relative to the subject matter hereof, and there are no promises, 
ag-reements, conditions or understanding, either oral or vVl'itten, express or implied, between 
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"Developer" and/or "Owner" and "City", other than as are stated herein. Except as herein 
otherwise provided, no subsequent alteration, amendment, change or addition to this 
Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto unless reduced to writing and signed by 
them or their successors in interest or their assigns, and pursuant, with respect to "City", to a 
duly adopted ordinance or resolution of "City". . 
21.1 No condition governing the uses and/or conditions governing remzoning of the 
subject "Property" herein provided for can be modified or amended without 
the approval of the City Council after the "City" has conducted public 
hearing(s) in accordance with the notice provisions provided for a zoning 
designation and/or amendment in force at the time of the proposed 
amendment. 
22. EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT: This Agreement shall be effective 
on the date the Meridian City Council shall adopt the amendment to the Meridian Zoning 
Ordinance in connection with the annexation and zoning of the "Property" and execution of 
the Mayor and City Clerk. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have herein executed this agreement 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
: ss 
County of Ada, ) 
On this ft day of Xu { V , 2006, before me, the undersigned, a 
Publi in and for /said State, personally appeared 
---...!~~~~-z:.'Lj~!.f-.J~IY--I------' known or identified to me to be the 
-..s....rcIloo£f:J".,...jI-Xo.P4----___ of Sea 2 Sea, LLC, acknowledged to. me that he 
e on behalf of said corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
: ss 
County of Ada, ) 
~ day of j U 1 V , 2006, before me, the 
~~~~~I;~~~i~~P~U~b~l~'c~~~.and for -raid State, personally appeared known or identified to me to be the Foothill Knights, LLC, acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same on be alf of said corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(SEAL) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
~~ No~ Public ~19a1> '(j~ J"!;b. 
ResIdmg at: 
My Commission EXpires~ICIf 
On this l~ik day of 2006, before me, a Notary 
Public, personally appeared Tammy de Weerd and illiam G. Berg, Jr., know or identified 
to me to b.e tfie.M~yor and Clerk, respectively, of the City of Meridian, who executed the 
instrument OF-' the 'Person that executed the instrument of behalf of said City, and 
acknowledged to me that such City executed the same. 
" ' iN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official sel$1.tl»ila.¥ and year in this certificate first above written . 
•• ~ ~l.tA JI,j •• 
l~ ~~~o~<.9i·. ~ . 
l / <1i~\ =:JO-.AOLnl~~ 
(SmAJ!-) iZ : Notary Public for Idaho 
~ \~"" / : Residing at: lb..ld\.&CU \D 
~~:QLlr // fJ~fII Commission expires: ..,!1.x,O_-L,!I'I_-.:..J11 __ _ 
@",2p "~.'Y..- 9,$\1I\)t> 
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TOOTHMAN. ORTON ENGINEERING COMPANY 
CONSULTtNO BNOINSER.S, SURVEYORS AND PLANNERS 
Project: 05143 
Date: December 21, 2005 
Page: 1 of 1 
9777 CHIN DEN BOULEVARD 
601SE, IDAHO 83714-2008 
208·323·2236 • fAX 206-323.2399 
boise@wellgrco.eom 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Land Description for CG Rezone 
A par~el ofland located in the NE ~ of the NE ~ of Section -26, Township 4 North, 
Range 1 'Jl~ Boi~e Meridian, Ada County, Ide.."ito, described as follows: 
Begi.nn~g at a found aluminum cap, marking the corner common to Sections 23, 24, 
25 and 20, from Which a found brass cap, marking the quartet comer common to said 
Sections 25 and 26, bears g,00054'56ltW., 2657.54 feet; thence, along the section line 
common to said Sections 25 and 26 (centerline ofN. Linder Road), 
1) S.Oo,~54'56"W .• ,663.91 feet; thence, leaving said section line, ........ ''*'., I 
2) N~&9°Q4'~.9'.'Wi,.72~.oi feet; thence, . 
3). N .00°21 'l:PW .• 656·.84 feet to the centerline of W. Chinden Boulevard; thence, 
along said centerline theJollowing Courses: 
4) S.89°3S'47"E., 650.61 feetto the beginning of a tangent curve; thence, 
5) Southeasterly along said curve to the right, having a radi).lS of 34,377.48 feet, an 
arc length of 80.89 feet, through. a central angle of 000 08'05", and a chord bearing 
and distance of S.89°34'44"E., 80.89 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
CONTAlNll'iG: 11.04 acres, more or less. 
SUBJECT TO: All Covenants, Rights, Rights-of-Way, .Easements of Reco~d and any 
Bncunibrances. .. . .. . , .. . ~ , . 
H:\D5143\WJ>iilesIDESCRIPTIONS\OSI 43-ExhA-CO Rezone,(joe 
CITY OF MERIDIAN 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND 
DECISION & ORDER 
" 
./,. 
.... ~:.. .. ,' . ~ ":.:,"'" _. ,., . ...: .:. ". -, .... 
In the Matter of Annexation and Zoning (AZ) from RUT to C-G and Preliminary Plat (PP) 
approval of 4 commercial building lots and 1 common/other lot on 10.01 acres for 
Knighthill Center Subdivision, by Sea 2 Sea, LLC. 
Case No(s): AZ-06-006 and PP-06-00S 
For the City Council Hearing Date of: May 9, 2006 
A. Findings of Fact 
RECEIVED 
MAY f 8 2006 
City, of Meridian 
City Clerk Office 
l, Hearing Facts (see attached Staff'Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated 
by reference) 
2, Process Facts (see attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated 
by reference) 
3. Application and Property Facts (see attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9, 
2006 incorporated by reference) 
4. Required Findings per the Unified Development Code (see attached Staff Report for the 
hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated by reference) 
B. Conclusions of Law 
1. The City of Meridian shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by the "Local Land Use 
Planning Act of 1975," codified at Chapter 65, Title 67, Idaho Code (I.C, §67-6503). 
2. The Meridian City Council takes judicial notice of its Unified Development Code 
codified at Title 11 Meridian City Code, and all current zoning maps thereof. The City of 
Meridian has, by ordinance, established the Impact Area and the Amended 
Comprehensive Plan of the City of Meridian, which was adopted August 6, 2002, 
Resolution No. 02-382 and Maps. 
3. The conditions shall be reviewable by the City Council pursuant to Meridian City Code § 
II-SA. 
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4. Due consideration has been given to the comment(s) received from the governmental 
subdivisions providing services in the City of Meridian planning jurisdiction. 
5. It is found public facilities and services required by the proposed development will not 
impose expense upon the public if the attached conditions of approval are imposed. 
6. That the City has granted an order of approval in accordance with this Decision, which 
shall be signed by the Mayor and City Clerk and then a copy served by the Clerk upon 
the applicant, the Planning Department, the Public Works Department and any affected 
party requesting notice. 
7. That this approval is subject to the Legal Description, Preliminary Plat, and the 
Conditions of Approval all in the attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9, 
2006 incorporated by reference. The conditions are concluded to be reasonable and the 
applicant shall meet such requirements as a condition of approval of the application. 
C. Decision and Order 
Pursuant to the City Council's authority as provided in Meridian City Code § ll-SA and 
based upon the above and foregoing Findings of Fact which are herein adopted, it is hereby 
ordered that: 
1. The applicant's Preliminary Plat as evidenced by having submitted the Preliminary Plat 
dated January 5,2006 is hereby conditionally approved; 
2. The site specific and standard conditions of approval are as shown in the attached Staff 
Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated by reference. 
D. Notice of Applicable Time Limits (as applicable) 
1. Notice of Preliminary Plat Duration 
Please take notice that approval of a preliminary plat, combined preliminary and final 
plat, or short plat shall become null and void if the applicant fails to record a fmal plat 
within two (2) years of the approval ofthe preliminary plat or one (1) year of the 
combined preliminary and final plat or short plat. In the event that the development of 
the preliminary plat is made in successive phases in an orderly and reasonable manner, 
and conforms substantially to the approved preliminary plat, such segments, if 
submitted within successive intervals of eighteen (18) months, may be considered for 
final approval without resubmission for preliminary plat approval. Upon written request 
and filed by the applicant prior to the termination of the period in accord with Il-6B-
7.A, the Director may authorize a single extension of time to record the final plat not to 
exceed eighteen (18) months. Additional time extensions up to eighteen (18) months as 
determined and approved by the City Council may be granted. With all extensjons, the 
Director or City Council may require the preliminary plat, combined preliminary and 
final plat or short plat to comply with the current provisions of Meridian City Code 
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Title 11. If the above timetable is not met and the applicant does not receive a time 
extension, the property shall be required to go through the platting procedure again. 
E. Notice of Final Action and Right to Regulatory Takings Analysis 
1. The Applicant is hereby notified that pursuant to Idaho Code 67·8003, a denial of a plat 
or conditional use pennit entitles the Owner to request a regulatory taking analysis. 
Such request must be in writing, and must be filed with the City Clerk not more than 
twenty-eight (28) days after the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A request 
for a regulatory takings analysis will toll the time period within which a Petition for 
Judicial Review may be filed. 
2. Please take notice that this is a final action of the goveming body of the City of 
Meridian, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67"6521 an affected person being a person who has 
an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of 
the conditional use pennit approval may within twenty-eight (28) days after the date of 
this decision and order seek a judicial review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho 
Code. 
F. Attached: Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9,2006 
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By action of the City Council at its regular meeting held on the 2.3 r;!:: day of 
______ , 2006. 
COUNCIL MEMBER SHAUN WARDLE 
COUNCIL MEMBER JOE BORTON 
COUNCIL MEMBER CHARLlli ROUNTREE 
COUNCIL MEMBER KEITH BIRD 




William G. Berg, Jr., itY Clerk'\ ~ r 1st. '#..j.> j 
.... , ..n.'t' S' 






)"fll~""""l" . _\"" 
fll,,"1,U ""n'" 
Copy served upon Applicant, The Planning uepartment, Public Works Department and City 
Attorney. 
By:jll.Vtf1~ LW 
. y Clerk 
Dated: 5~ 3Q-du> 
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STAFF REPORT City Council Hearing 
Hearing Date: 5/9/2006 
Mayor and City Council 
J ,,,",,:· .. r :; ,i ~},',;': 




Josh Wilson, Associate City Planner 
Knighthill Center Subdivision 
• AZ-06-006 
~'1/ 6'J7~;!j ie;{}1 '. 
.::. ~', . 
. ;. :-:" '.--.- -- ~: .,.:.:.: .... 
Annexation and Zoning of 10m acres from RUT to CoG zone 
• PP-06-00S 
Preliminary Plat of 4 commercial building lots and 1 common lot on 10,01 
acres in a proposed CoG zone 
1. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT'S REQUEST 
The applicant, Sea 2 Sea, LLC, has applied for Annexation and Zoning (AZ) of 10.01 acres from RUT 
(Ada County) to CoG (General Retail and Service Commercial) and Preliminary Plat approval of 4 
commercial building lots and 1 common lot on 10.01 acres, The applicant has submitted a conceptual site 
plan which shows retail, restaurant and financial institution uses on the property. The site is located on 
the southwest comer ofN, Linder Road and Chinden Road (SH 20/26). 
2. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION: The Meridian Planning and Zoning Commission heard the 
item on March 2 and April 6, 2006. At the public hearing they moved to recommend approval. 
a. Summary of Public Hearing: 
I. In favor: Shawn Nickel 
II. In opposition: None, 
iii. Commenting: None. 
IV. Staff presenting application: Josh Wilson. 
v. Other staff commenting on application: None. 
h. Key Issues of Discussion by Commission: 
i. Appearance of the rear of the proposed buHdings from W. Everest Lane 
ii. Access to W. Everest Lane, which is a private street 
c. Key Commission Changes to Staff Recommendation: 
1. Add a Condition which states: "The applicant shall modify the plat to include a 
cross access/parking easement for all lots within the subdivision:' 
11. Add a restriction to the Development Agreement which states: "The applicant 
shall provide sign age which indicates that there is an exit towards W. Everest 
Lane." 
iii, Add a restriction to the Development Agreement which states: "The applicant 
shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the development 
to the west for access to W. Everest Lane, which is a private street." 
d. Outstanding Issue(s) for City Council: 
1. None, 
3. PROPOSED MOTIONS 
Approval 
After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to approve File Numbers AZ-
Knighthill Center Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-06-005 PAGE 1 
CITY OF MERIDIAN PLANNING DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT FOR THE HEARING DATE OF MAY 9,2006 
06·006 and PP-06-005 as presented in the staff report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006, with 
the following modifications to the proposed development agreement: (add any proposed 
modifications.) 
Denial 
After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to deny File Numbers AZ-06-
006 and PP-06-005 as presented in the staff report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006, for the 
following reasons: (you should state specific reasons for denial of the annexation request.) 
Continuance , 
After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to continue File Numbers 
AZ-06-006 and PP-06-005 to the hearing date of (insert continued hearing date here) for the 
following reason(s): (you should state specifiC reason(s) for continuance.) 
4. APPLICATION AND PROPERTY FACTS 
a. Site Address/Location: 
Southwest corner ofN. Linder Road and Chinden Road (SH 20/26) 
NE 1;4, NE \4, Section 26, T4N Rl W 
b. Owners: 
Foothill Knights, LLC 
757 W. Bankside Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
c. Applicant: 
Sea 2 Sea, LLC 
757 W. Bankside Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
d. Representative: Shawn Nickel, SLN Planning, Inc. 
e. Present Zoning: RUT 
f. Present Comprehensive Plan Designation: Low Density Residential 
g. Description of Applicant's Request: 
1. Date of Preliminary Plat (attached as Exhibit A 1): January 5, 2006 
2. Date of Landscape Plan (attached as Exhibit A2): January 4,2006 
5. PROCESS FACTS 
a. The subject application will in fact constitute an annexation as determined by City Ordinance. 
By reason of the provisions ofUDC 11-5B-3, a public hearing is required before the City 
Council on this matter. 
b. The subject application will in fact constitute a preliminary plat as determined by City 
Ordinance. By reason ofthe provisions ofUDe 11-6B-2, a public hearing is required before 
the City Council on this matter. 
c. Newspaper notifications published on: April 17 and May I, 2006 
d. Radius notices mailed to properties within 300 feet on: April 14, 2006 
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e. Applicant posted notice on site by: May I, 2006 
6. LAND USE 
a. Existing Land Use(s): Vacant land 
b. Description of Character of Surrounding Area: The property sits on the southwest corner of 
Linder Road and Chinden Road, which are both major roadways in the area and can)' large 
amounts of vehicular traffic. To the south and west is Lochsa Falls Subdivision, which 
contains over 800 single family homes and vacant commercial lots along Chinden Road. 
c. Adjacent Land Use and Zoning 
1. North: Chinden Road and vacant land, zoned RUT (Ada County). 
2. East: Vacant land, zoned RUT (Ada County). 
3. South: Lochsa Falls Subdivision, zoned R-4. 
4. West: Locbsa Falls Subdivision, zoned RA. 
d. History of Previous Actions: None. 
e. Existing Constraints and Opportunities 
1. Public Works 
Location of sewer: There is currently sewer in W. Everest Lane and N. Gertie 
Place. 
Location of water: There are water stubs in W. Everest Land and N. Gertie 
Place. 
Issues or concerns: Water main sizing. 
2. Vegetation: None. 
3. Flood plain: NA 
4. Canals/Ditches Irrigation: No major facilities. 
5. Hazards: None known. 
6. Proposed Zoning: C-G 
7. Size of Property: 10.01 acres 
f. Subdivision Plat Information 
1. Residential Lots: 0 
2. Non-residential Lots: 4 
3. Total Building Lots: 4 
4. Common Lots: I 
5. Other Lots: N/A 
6. Total Lots: 5 
7. Open Lots: 
g. Landscaping 
1. Width of street buffer(s): 35 feet on Linder Road and Chinden Road. 
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2. Width ofbuffer(s) between land uses: 25 feet 
3. Percentage of site as open space: 1.01 acres/lO% 
4. Other landscaping standards: 
h. Proposed and Required Non-Residential Setbacks: per the C~G zone 
CoG Standard 
Front o feet 
Side o feet 
Rear o feet 
Max. Building Height 65 feet 
Min. Lot Size None 
Min. Street Frontage None 
i. Summary of Proposed Streets and/or Access (private, public, common drive, etc.): The access 
to the development will be from N. Linder Road to the east and from W. Everest Lane to the 
west. A private commercial drive aisle will provide traffic circulation through the site. A 
connection will also be made to the stub (N Gertie Place) provided from the south by Lochsa 
Falls Subdivision. The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State 
Highway 20-26) but is not proposing direct access to that facility. 
7. COMMENTS MEETING 
On Febtuary 10, 2005 Planning Staff held an agency comments meeting. The agencies and departments 
present included: Meridian Fire Department, Meridian Police Department, Meridian Parks Department, 
Meridian Public Works Department, and the Sanitary Services Company. Staff has included all comments 
and recommended actions as Conditions of Approval in the attached Exhibit B. 
8. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN POLICIES AND GOALS 
This property is designated "Medium Density Residential" on the Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use 
Map. Medium density residential areas are anticipated to contain between three and eight dwellings per 
acre (see Page 95 of the Comprehensive Plan.) NOTE: The designation of the subject site on the 
Comprehensive Pian Future Land Use Map is proposed to be amended to "Mixed Use Community" with .t. _ 
the current North Meridian Area Comprehensive Plan Amendment (NMA CPA). The NMA CPA is 
scheduled to be on the March 7, 2006 City Council agenda. If approved by the City Council, as 
recommended by the Commission, this application would comply with the new map designation. 
Staff finds the following Comprehensive Plan policies to be applicable to this property and apply to the 
proposed development (staff analysis in italics below policy): 
• Chapter VII, Goal III, Objective A, Action I 0 Require that development projects have planned 
for the provision of all public services. 
When the City established its Area of City impact, it planned to provide City services to the subject 
property. The City of Meridian plans to provide municipal services to the lands proposed to be 
annexed in the following manner: 
\) Sanitary sewer and water service will be extended to the project at the developer's expense. 
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• The subject lands currently lie within the jurisdiction of the Meridian Rural Fire District. 
Once annexed the lands will be under the jurisdiction of the Meridian City Fire Department, 
who currently shares resource and personnel with the Meridian Rural Fire Department. 
• The subject lands currently lie within the jurisdiction of the Ada County . Sheriff's Office. 
Once annexed the lands will be serviced by the Meridian Police Department (MPD). 
• The roadways adjacent to the subject lands are currently owned and maintained by the Ada 
County Highway District (ACHD). This service will not change. 
• The subject lands are currently serviced by the Meridian School District #2. This service will 
not change. 
• The su~iect lands are currently serviced by the Meridian Library District. This service will 
not change and the Meridian Library District should suffer no revenue loss as a result of the 
subject annexation. 
Municipal, fee-supported, services will be provided by the Meridian BUilding Department, the 
Meridian Public Works Department, the Meridian Water Department, the Meridian Wastewater 
Department, the Meridiem Planning Department, Meridian Utility Billing Services, and Sanitary 
Services Company. 
• Chapter VI, Goal II, Objective A, Action 6 - Require street connections between subdivisions at 
regular intervals to enhance connectivity and better traffic flow. 
The submitted preliminary plat proposes to connect to the public stub street from Lochsa Falls 
Subdivision to the south and the private stub street from Lochsa Falls SubdiVision to the west. 
• Chapter VII, Goal IV, Objective D, Action 2 ~ Restrict curb cuts and access points on collectors 
and arterial streets. 
The applicant has proposed one curb cut on N Linder Road, which was approved by ACnD and is 
supported by staff.' 
• "Plan for a vat;ety of commercial and retail opportunities within the Impact Area." (Chapter VII, 
Goal 1, Objective B) 
The proposed use does contribute to the variety of commercial uses in this area, as envisioned with 
the Comprehensive Plan Amendment. , 
• "Restrict curb cuts and access points on collectors and arterial streets." (Chapter VII, Goal IV, 
Objective D, Action item 2) 
The Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) has previously submitted letters to the City stating that 
their policy for access to a Type IV Principal Arterial will be at intersections only, and spaced at one-
ha/fmile intervals in urban areas. lTD allows approaches (other than intersections) in special cases 
and on a temporary basis. Staff finds that the proposal of no access point to Chinden Boulevard (SH 
20-26) meets the location requirements of lTD. Further, stafffinds that Ten Mile Road will serve as , I 
the access point to Chinden Boulevardfor all the properties in this section. lTD has conditioned the 
subdivision/or additional rights of way along Chin den Boulevard, a redesign o/the proposal dated 
July 05, 2005 has been submitted which shows the right-of-way line at 90 feet to center linefor 
approximately the first 500 feet east of the centerline ofTen Mae Road. 
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The applicant is requesting to retain Lot 30, Block 1 of the design dated January 19,2006. This lot 
should be noted on the plat that it is for future right of way reservation for when lTD roadway 
improvements occur. The width of right of way reservations shall be as set forth by the lTD, UDC 
J J-3H-3C.2 
Staff believes that the proposed zoning for this property is appropriate. Staff recommends that the 
Commission and Council rely on any verbal or written testimony that may be provided at the public 
hearing when determining if the applicant's zoning and development request is appropriate for this 
property. 
9. ZONING ORDINANCE 
a. Zoning Schedule of Use Control: UDC 11-2B-2 lists retail, restaurants, and fmancial 
institutions as a Permitted Uses in the C-G zone. 
b. Purpose Statement of Zone: The purpose of the Commercial Districts is to provide for the 
retail and service needs of the community in accord with the Meridian Comprehensive Plan. 
Four Districts are designated which differ in the size and scale of commercial structures 
accommodated in the district, the scale and mix of allowed commercial uses, and the location 
of the district ill proximity to streets and highways. 
10. ANALYSIS 
a. Analysis of Facts Leading to Staff Recommendation 
ANNEXATION ANALYSIS: Based on the policies and goals contained in the Comprehensive 
Plan and the general compliance of the proposed development with the Zoning Ordinance, staff 
believes that this is a good location for the proposed single family development. Please see 
Exhibit D for detailed analysis of facts and findings. 
The annexation legal description submitted with the application (prepared on December 22, 2005 
by Jeffery McAllister, PLS) shows the property as contiguous to the existing corporate boulldary 
of the City of Meridian. 
Prior to the annexation ordinance approval, a Development Agreement (DA) shall be entered into 
between the City of Meridian, property oWner (at the time of annexation ordinance adoption), and 
the developer. The applicant shall contact the City Attorney. Bill Nary, at 888-4433 to initiate this 
process within 18 months of City Council approval of the annexation request. The DA shall 
incorporate the following: 
• All future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes, materials, equipment and 
conditions of operation that will be detrimental to any persons, property or the general welfare by 
reason of excessive production oftraftic, noise, smoke, fumes, glare or odors. 
• All future development of the subject property shall be constructed in accordance with City 
of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of development. 
\! The applicant will be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer and water service 
extension. 
• Any existing domestic wells and/or septic systems within this project will have to be removed 
from their domestic service, per City Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available 
from the City of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as landscape 
irrigation. 
@ Prior to issuance of any building permit, the subject property shall be sub~ivided in 
accordance with the City of Meridian Unified Development Code. 
() A 2S·foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be stubbed to the property 
located at 6175 N. Linder Road. 
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• Development of the property shall comply substantially with the conceptual site plan shown 
on the preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006. 
• The applicant shall provide sign age which indicates that there is an exit towards W. 
Everest Lane. 
• The applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the 
development to the west for access to W. Everest Lane. which is a private street. 
PRELIMINARY PLAT ANALYSIS: Based on the policies and goals contained in the 
Comprehensive Plan and the general compliance of the proposed development with the Zoning 
Ordinance, staff believes that this is a good location for the proposed commercial development. 
Please see Exhibit D for detailed analysis of facts and fmdings. 
1. Right of way along Chinden: The submitted preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006 
shows a 100-foot from centerline right-of-way on Chinden Road, which is consistent with 
the Idaho Transportation Department's requirements along Chinden Road. 
2. Conifers in Street Buffer along Linder and Chinden: The submitted landscape plan 
shows coniferous trees located in the street buffer adjacent to Linder Road and Chinden 
Road. Per UDC 11-3B-5C conifers are prohibited in street buffers, unless planted in the 
middle of a buffer which is 20 feet wider, or wider. Please modify the landscape plan 
prior to submittal of final plat to show conifers placed ONLY in the middle of the 
required street buffer. 
3. Parking Lot Landscaping: Landscape plans shall be submitted with the Certificate of 
Zoning Compliance applications for the development which comply with City Code. 
Specifically, the submitted conceptual site plan does not provide landscape islands and 
associated vegetation as required by UDC 11-3B-8C2. 
4. Design Review: Per UDC 11-3A-19, the structures within the development shall be 
subject to administrative design review and a Design Review application shall submitted 
concurrently with the application for Certificate of Zoning Compliance. 
5. Stub Streets: Staff is supportive of the connections to the two stub streets from the south 
and west from Lochsa Falls Subdivision. The preliminary plat should be revised to show J • • " 
a stubbed conunercial drive aisle and cross l\ccess easement to the north property line of 
the property located to the south of the entrance off ofN. Linder Road, known as 6175 N. 
Linder Road. 
6. Pressure Irrigation: The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be 
supplied by a year-round source of water. The applicant should be required to utilize any 
existing surface or well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not 
available, a single-point connection to the culinary water system shall be required. If a 
single-point connection is utilized, the developer will be responsible for the payment of 
assessments for the common areas prior to signature on the [mal plat by the City 
Engineer. An underground, pressurized irrigation system should be installed to all 
landscape areas per the approved specifications and in accordance with UDC 11-3A-15 
and MCC 9-1-28. 
7. Common Areas: Maintenance of all conunon areas shall be the responsibi.1ity of the 
Knighthill Center Business Owners' Association. 
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8. Ditches. Laterals. and Canals: Per UDC 11-3Aa 6 all irrigation ditches, laterals or canals, 
exclusive of natural waterways and waterways being used as amenities, that intersect, 
cross or lie within the area being subdivided shall be covered. . 
11. EXHIBITS 
A. Drawings 
I. Preliminary Plat (dated; January 4,2006) 
2. Landscape Plan (dated; January 5, 2006) 
B. Conditions of Approval 
1. Planning Department 
2. Public Works Department 
3. Fire Department 
4. Police Department 
5. Parks Department 
6. Sanitary Service Company 
7. Ada County Highway District 
C. Legal Description 
D. Required Findings from Zoning Ordinance 
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2. Landscape Plan (dated: January 5, 2005) 
',': 
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B. Conditions of Approval 
1. PLANNING DEPARTMENT 
l.l ANNEXATION COMMENTS 
Prior to the annexation ordinance approval, a Development Agreement (DA) shall be entered into 
between the City of Meridian, property owner (at the time of annexation ordinance adoption), and 
the developer. The applicant shall contact the City Attorney, Bill Nary, at 888-4433 to initiate this 
process within 18 months of City Council approval of the annexation request. The DA shall 
incorporate the following: 
• All future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes, materials, equipment and 
conditions of operation that will be detrimental to any persons, property or the general 
welfare by reason of excessive production of traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, gJare or odors. 
• All future development of the subject property shall be constructed in accordance with City 
of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of development. 
• The applicant will be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer and water service 
extension. 
• Any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this project will have to be removed 
from their domestic service, per City Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available 
from the City of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as landscape 
irrigation. 
• Prior to issuance of any building penuit, the subject property be subdivided in accordance 
with the City of Meridian Unified Development Code. 
• A 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be stubbed to the property 
located at 6175 N. Linder Road. 
e Development of the property shall comply substantially with the conceptual site plan shown 
on the preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006. 
• The applicant shall provide signage which indicates that there is an exit towards W. Eyerest 
Lane. 
e The applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the 
devctloJlment to the west for access to W. Everest Lane. which is a private street. 
• That the applicant has offered. and shall provide, sidewalk along the landscape buffer 
areas on the south side of the development and dp to EVerest Lane. 
1.2 SITE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS-PRELIMINARY PLAT 
1.2.1 The preliminary plat prepared by Toothman-Orton Engineering, dated January 4, 2006, is 
approved, with the conditions listed herein. All comments/conditions of the accompanying 
Annexation/Zoning (AZ-06-006) shall also be considered conditions of the Preliminary Plat (PP-
06-005). 
1.2.2 Maintenance of all common areas shall be the responsibility ofthe Knighthill Center Subdivision 
Business Owner's Association. 
1.2.3 The applicant shall modify the plat to include a cross access/parking easement for all lots within 
the subdivision. 
1.2.4 The preliminary plat shall be modified to reflect the conditions contained in this report .and 10 
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1.2.5 The landscape plan shall be modified to reflect the conditions contained in this report and the 
,- revised preliminary plat and shall be submitted with the final plat app1i.cation. 
1.2.6 Modify the landscape plan prior to submittal of final plat to show conifers placed ONLY in the 
middle of the required street buffer along Chin den Road and Linder Road. 
1.2.7 Landscape plans shall be submitted with the Certificate of Zoning Compliance applications fot 
the development which comply with City Code. Specifically, the submitted conceptual site plan 
does not provide landscape islands and associated vegetation as required by UDC 11-3B-8C2. 
1.2.8 Per UDC 11-3A-19, the structures within the development shall be subject to administrative 
design review and a Design Review application shall submitted concurrently with the application 
for Certificate of Zoning Compliance. 
1.2.9 The preliminary plat shall be revised to provide a stubbed 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle 
and cross access easement to the north property line of the property known as 6175 N. Linder 
Road. 
1.2.10 All areas approved as open space shall be free of wet ponds or other such nuisances. All 
stormwater detention facilities incorporated into the approved open space are subject to UDC 11-
3A-18 and shall be fully vegetated with grass and trees. Sand, gravel or other non-vegetated 
surface materials shall not be used in open space lots, except as permitted under UDC 11-3B. If 
the stormwater detention facility cannot be incorporated into the approved open space and still 
meet the standards of UOC 11-3A-18, then the applicant shall relocate the facility. This may 
require losing a developable lot or developable area. It is the responsibility of the 
developer to comply with ACRO, City of Meridian and aU other regulatory requirements at the 
time of final construction. 
1.2.11 Where the applicant has submitted a preliminary landscape plan and where staff has reviewed 
such plan, the landscaping shall be consistent with the preliminary plan with modifications as 
proposed by staff. 
1.2.12 Per UDC 11-3A-6 all irrigation ditches, laterals or canals, exclusive of natural waterways and 
waterways being used as amenities, that intersect, cross or lie within the area being subdivided 
shall be covered. 
1.3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS-PRELIMINARY PLAT 
1.3.1 Sidewalks shaH be installed within the subdivision and on the perimeter of the subdivision 
pursuant to UDC 11-3A-17. 
1 .3.2 The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be supplied by a year-round 
source of water (MCC 12-13-8.3). The applicant should be required to utilize any existing surface 
or well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not available, a single-point 
connection to the culinary water system shall be required. If a single-point connection' is utilized, 
the developer will be responsible for the payment of assessments for the common areas prior to 
signature on the final plat by the City Engineer. An underground, pressurized irrigation system 
should be installed to all landscape areas per the approved specifications and in accordance with 
UOC 11-3A-15 and MCC 9-1-28. 
1.3.3 A detailed landscape plan, in compliance with the landscape and subdivision ordinance and as f 
noted in this repOlt, shall be submitted for the subdivision with the final plat application. 
1.3.4 The applicant shall submit a detailed fencing plan with the final plat applicatir;mfor the 
subdivision. If pennanent fencing is not provided, temporary construction fencing to contain 
debris must be installed around the perimeter prior to issuance of a building pemnt. All fences 
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should taper down to 3 feet maximum within 20 feet of all right-of.way. All fencing should be 
installed in accordance with UDC 11~3AQ7. 
13.5 Any tree over 4" in caliper that is removed from the property shall be replaced by installing 
additional trees, being the equivalent number of caliper inches of trees that were removed. 
Required landscaping trees will not be considered as replacement trees for those trees that have to 
be mitigated. 
1.3.6 All irrigation ditches, laterals o{ canals, exclusive of the Ten Mile Stub Drain, intersecting, 
crossing or lying adjacent and contiguous to the area being subdivided shall be tiled per UDC 11-
3A-6, unless otherwise approved by Nampa Meridian Irrigation District. Plans will need to be 
approved by the appropriate irrigation/drainage district, or lateral users association (ditch 
owners), with wdtten approval or non-approval submitted to the Public Works Department. If 
lateral users association approval can not be obtained, alternate plans will be reviewed and 
approved by the City Engineer prior to final plat signature. 
1.3.7 Staffs failure to cite specific ordinance provisions or terms of the approved 
annexation/conditional use does not relieve the applicant of responsibility for compliance. 
1.3.8 Preliminary plat approval shall be subject to the expiration provisions set forth in UDC 11-6B-7. 
2. PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 
2.1 Sanitary sewer service to this development is being proposed via extension of mains in N.Gertie 
Place and W. Everest Lane. The applicant shall install all mains necessary to provide service; 
applicant shall coordinate main size and rquting with the Public Works Department, and execute 
standard fOims of easements for any mains that are required to provide service. Minimum cover 
over sewer mains is three feet, if cover from top of pipe to sub-grade is less than three feet than 
alternate materials shall be used in conformance with the City of Meridian Public Works 
Departments Standard Specifications. 
2.2 Water service to this site is being proposed via extension of mains in W. Everest Lane and N. 
Gertie Place. The applicant shall be responsible to install water mains to and through this 
development, coordinate main size and routing with Public Works, and execute standard forms of 
easements for any mains that are required to provide service. 
2.3 . The preliminary plat indicates all new water mains will be eight-inch. Th.e applicant shall be 
required to install a twelve-inch main from the twelve-inch main in W. Everett to Linder Road, 
with a connection to the twelve inch main located to the south of this project in Linder Road. The 
shall be in lieu of running water main in the arterial frontages. 
2.4 The applicant shall provide a 20-foot easement for all public water/sewer mains outside of public 
right of way (include all water services and hydrants). 
2.5 A pressurized irrigation system is required for all subdivisions per UDC 11-3A-1S. The applicant 
has not indicated who will own and operate the pressure irrigation system in this proposed 
development. lfit is to be maintained as a private system, plans and specifications will be 
reviewed by the Public Works Department as part of the construction plan review. A "draft 
copy" of the operations and maintenance manual will be required prior to plan approval with the 
"final draft" being required prior to final plat signature on the last phase of this project. 
If it is to be owned and maintained by an Irrigation District then evidence of a license agreement 
shall be submitted prior to schedUling of a pre-construction meeting. 
2.6 The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be supplied by a year-round 
source of water (UDC 11-3A-6). The applicant should be required to use any existing surface or 
well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not available, a singleopoint 
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connection to the culinary water system shall be required. Ifa single-point connection is utilized, 
the developer will be responsible for the payment of assessments for the common areas prior to 
signature on the final plat by the City Engineer. 
2.7 Any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this project shall be removed from 
domestic service per City Ordinance Section 9-1-4 and 9·4-8. Wells may be used for non-
domestic purposes such as landscape irrigation. 
2.8 All irrigation ditches, laterals or canals, exclusive of natural waterways, intersecting, crossing or 
lying adjacent and contiguous to the area being subdivided shall be tiled per UDC 11-3A-6. 
Plans shall be approved by the appropriate irrigation/drainage district, or lateral users association 
(ditch owners), with written approval or non-approval submitted to the Public Works Department. 
Iflateral users association approval can't be obtained, alternate plans shaH be reviewed and 
approved by the Meridian City Engineer prior to final plat signature. 
2.9 A drainage plan designed by a State of Idaho licensed architect or engineer is required and shan 
be submitted to the City Engineer (Ord. 557, 10-1-91) for all off-street parking areas. Storm water 
treatment and disposal shall be designed in accordance with Department of Enviromnental 
Quality 1997 publication Catalog of Storm Water Best Management Practices for Idaho Cities 
and Counties and City of Meridian standards and policies. Off-site disposal into surface water is 
prohibited unless the jurisdiction which has authority over the receiving stream provides written 
authorization prior to development plan approval. The applicant is responsible for filing all 
necessary applications with the Idaho Department of Water Resources regarding Shallow 
Injection Wells. 
2. J 0 Street signs are to be in place, water system shall be approved and activated, fencing installed, 
drainage lots constructed, road base approved and the Final Plat for this subdivision shall be 
recorded, prior to applying for building permits. 
2.11 A letter of credit or cash surety in the amount of 110% will be required for all uncompleted 
fencing, landscaping, amenities, pressurized iuigation, sanitary sewer, water, etc., prior to 
signature on the final plat. 
2.12 All development improvements, including but not limited to sewer, fencing, micro-paths, 
pressurized irrigation and landscaping shall be installed and approved prior to obtaining 
certificates of occupancy. 
2.13 Applicant shall be required to pay Public Works development plan review, and construction 
inspection fees, as determined during the plan review process, prior to signature on the fmal plat 
per Resolution 02-374. 
2.14 It shall be the responsibility ofthe applicant to ensure that all development features comply with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act. 
2.15 Applicant shall be responsible for application and compliance with and NPDES Permitting that 
may be required by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
2.16 Applicant shall be responsible for application and compliance with any Section 404 Permitting 
that may be required by the Army Corps ofEngilleers. 
2.17 The engineer shall be required to certify that the street centerline elevations are set a minimum of 
3-feet above the highest established peak groundwater elevation. 
3. FIRE DEPARTMENT 
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1. Acceptance of the water supply for fire protection will be by the Meridian Fire Department 
and water quality by the Meridian Water Department for bacteria testing. 
2. Final Approval of the fire hydrant locations shall be by the Meridian Fire Department. 
a. Fire Hydrants shall have the 4 W' outlet face the main street or parking lot aisle. 
b. The Fire hydrant shall not face a street which does not have addresses on it. 
c. Fire hydrant markers shall be provided per Public Works specifications. 
d. Fire Hydrants shall be placed on comers when spacing permits. 
e. Fire hydrants shall not have any vertical obstructions to outlets within 10'. 
f. Fire hydrants shall be place 18" above finish grade. 
g. Fire hydrants shall be provided to meet the requirements of the IFC Section 509.5. 
h. Show all proposed or existing hydrants for all new construction or additions to 
. existing buildings within 1,000 feet of the project. 
3. All entrance and internal roads and alleys shall have a turning radius of28' inside and 48' 
outside radius. 
4. All common driveways shall be straight or have a turning radius of 28' inside and 48' 
outside and shall have a clear driving surface which is 20' wide. 
5. Provide a 20-foot wide Fire Lane for all internal roadways all roadways shall be marked 
in accordance with Appendix D Section DI03.6 Signs. 
6. For all Fire Lanes, provide sign age "No Parking Fire Lane". 
7. Insure that all yet undeveloped parcels are maintained free of combustible vegetation. 
8. Fire lanes and streets shall have a vertical clearance of 13'6". This includes mature 
landscaping. 
9. Operational fire hydrants, temporary or permanent street signs and access roads with an all 
weather surface are required before combustible construction is brought on site. 
10. Building setbacks shall be per the International Building Code for one and two story 
construction. 
11. The roadways shall be built to Ada County Highway Standards cross section 
requirements and shall have a clear driving surface, available at all times, which is 20' 
wide. Streets with less than a 29' street width shall have no parking. Streets with less 
than 33' shall have parking only on one side. These measurements shall be based on the 
face of curb dimension. The roadway shall be able to accommodate an imposed load of 
75,000 GVW. 
12. Commercial and office occupancies will require a fire-flow consistent with the 
Intemational Fire Code to service the proposed project. Fire hydrants shall be placed per 
Appendix D. 
13. The fire department requests that any future signalization installed as the result of the 
development of this project be equipped with Opticom Sensors to ensure a safe and 
efficient response by fire and emergency medical servic.e vehicles. This cost of this 
installation is to be borne by the developer. 
14. Maintain a separation of5' from the building to the dumpster enclosure. 
15. Provide a Knox box entry system for the complex prior to occupancy. 
16. The first digit of the Apartment/Office Suite shall correspond to the floor level. 
17. The applicant shall work with Planning Department staff to provide an address identification 
plan and a sign which meets the requirements of the City of Meridian sign ordinance at the 
required intersection( s). 
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18. All portions of the buildings located on this project must be within 150' of a paved surface 
as measured around the perimeter ofthe bUilding. 
19. Provide exterior egress lighting as required by the International Building & Fire Codes. 
20. There shall be a fire hydrant within 100' of all Fire Department connections. 
4. POLICE DEPARTMENT 
1. The Police Department would like the proposed financial institution relocated from the 
northeast comer of the site to the southeast comer of the site for better police visibility 
and approach. 
5. PARKS DEPARTMENT 
1. The Parks Department has no concerns with the site design as submitted with the 
application. 
6. SANITARY /iERVICE COMPANY 
1. Please contact Bill Gregory at SSC (888-3999) for detailed review of your proposal and 
submit stamped (approved) plans with your certificate of zoning compliance application. 
7. ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
Site Specific Conditions of Appro val 
1. Dedicate a total of 48-feet of right-of-way from the centerline of Linder Road abutting the parcel 
by means of a warranty deed. The right-of-way purchase and sale agreement and deed must be 
completed and signed by the applicant prior to scheduling the final plat for signature by the 
ACHD Commission or prior to issuance of a building permit (or other required permits), 
whichever occurs first. Allow up to 30 business days to process the right-of-way dedication after 
receipt of all requested material. The owner will be paid the fair market value of the right·of-way 
dedicated which is an addition to existing ACHD right-of-way. 
2. Construct a 5-foot detached concrete sidewalk abutting the site on Linder Road. The sidewalk 
shall be located a minimum of 41-feet from the centerline of the roadway. The applicant should 
work with ACHD and the landowner of the out-parcel that fronts on Linder Road to extend a 
continuous sidewalk to the intersection of Linder Road and Chinden Boulevard. 
3. Construct a northbound left-turn lane on Linder Road at the site access intersection. 
4. Construct a curb return full access driveway on Linder Road located at the south property line 
(approximately 600-feet south of Chin den Boulevard), as proposed. construct a separate left and 
right turn lane for the eastbound (exiting) approach. 
5. Comply with the requirements of the Idaho Transportation Department for right-of-way, access, 
and improvements to Chinden Boulevard (US 20/26). 
6. Connect to Gertie Place, a public stub street at the south property line, as proposed. 
7. Connect to Everest Street, a private street at the west property line, as proposed. 
8. Provide a cross-access easement to the O.6-acre out-parcel to the south, as proposed. 
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9. Other than the access specifically approved with this application, direct lot access is prohibited to 
Linder Road and shall be noted on the fmal plat. 
10. Comply with all Standard Conditions of Approval. 
Standard Conditions o(Approval 
I. Any existing in'igation facilities shall be relocated outside of the right~of.way. 
2. Private sewer or water systems are prohibited from being located within any ACHD roadway or 
right-of-way. 
3. All utility relocation costs associated with improving street frontages abutting the site shall be 
borne by the developer. 
4. Replace any existing damaged curb, gutter and sidewalk and any that may be damaged during the 
constmction of the proposed development. Contact Construction Services at 387-6280 (with file 
number) for details. 
5. Comply with the District's Tree Planter Width Interim Policy. 
6. Utility street cuts in pavement less than five years old are not allowed unless approved in writing 
by the District. Contact the District's Utility Coordinator at 387-6258 (with file numbers) for 
details. 
7. All design and construction shall be in accordance with the Ada County Highway District Policy 
Manual, ISPWC Standards and approved supplements, Constmction Services procedures and all 
applicable ACHD Ordinances unless specifically waived herein. An engineer registered in the 
State ofIdaho shall prepare and certify all improvement plans. 
8. The applicant shall submit revised plans for staff approval, prior to issuance of building permit 
(or other required pennits), which incorporates any required design changes. 
9. Construction, use and property development shall be in conformance with all applicable 
requirements of the Ada County Highway District prior to District approval for occupancy. 
10. Payment of applicable road impact fees are required prior to building construction in accordance 
with Ordinance #200, also known as Ada County Highway District Road Impact Fee Ordinance. 
11. It is the responsibility of the applicant to verify all existing utilities within the right-of-way. The 
applicant at no cost to ACHD shall repair existing utilities damaged by the applicant. The 
applicant shall be required to call DIOLINE (1-800-342-1585) at least two full business days 
prior to breaking ground within ACHD right-of-way. The applicant shall contact ACHD Traffic 
Operations 387-6190 in the event any ACHD conduits (spare or filled) are compromised during 
any phase of construction. 
12. No change in the terms and conditions of this approval shall be valid unless they are in writing 
and signed by the applicant or the applicant's authorized representative and an authorized' 
representative of the Ada County Highway District. The burden shall be upon the applicant to 
obtain written confirmation of any change from the Ada County Highway District. 
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13. Any change by the applicant in the planned use of the property which is the subject of this 
application, shall require the applicant to comply with all rules, regulations, ordinances, plans, or 
other regulatory and legal restrictions in force at the time the applicant or its successors in interest 
advises the Highway District of its intent to change the planned use ofthe subject property unless 
a waiver/variance of said requirements or other legal relief is granted pursuant to the law in effect 
at the time the change in use is sought. 
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C. Legal Description 
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CITY OF MERIDIAN PLANNING DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT FOR THE HEARING DATE OF MAY 9, 2006 
D. Required Findings from Zoning Ordinance 
1. Annexation Findings: 
Upon recommendation from the Commission, the Council shall make a filII investigation 
and shall, at the public hearing, review the application. In order to grant an annexation 
and/or rezone, the Council shall make the following tIn dings: 
t. The map amendment complies with the applicable provisions of the comprehensive 
plan; 
The applicant is proposing to zone all of the subject property to C-G. City Council fmds 
that the proposed zoning map amendment complies with the applicable provisions of the 
comprehensive plan. Please see Comprehensive Ptan Policies and Goals, Section 8, of the 
Staff Report. 
2. The map amendment complies with the regulations outlined for the proposed 
district, specifically the purpose statement; 
City Council finds that retail, restaurant, and financial institution uses are allowed within 
the requested zoning district of C-G as a Principally Pemlitted Use. The accompanying 
plat demonstrates the land wilJ be developed with lot sizes and other dimensional 
requirements that conform to the proposed zoning designation. 
3. The map amendment shall not be materially detrimental to the public health, safety, 
and welfare; 
City Council finds that the proposed zoning amendment will not be detrimental to the 
public health, safety, or welfare. 
4. The map amendment shall not result in an adverse impact upon the delivery of 
services by any political subdivision providing public services within the City 
5. 
including, but not limited to, school districts; and, . 
City CO\.l11cil finds that the proposed zoning amendment will not r.esult in any adverse 
impact upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision providing services to 
this site. 
The annexation is in the best of interest of the City (UDC 11-5B-3.E). 
City Council finds that all essential services are available or will be provided by the 
developer to the subject property and will not require unreasonable expenditure of public 
funds. The applicant is proposing to develop the land in general compliance with the 
City's Comprehensive Plan. This is a logical expansion of the City limits. In accordance 
with the findings listed above, City Council finds that Annexation and Zon:ii1g of this 
property to C-G would be in the best interest of the City. 
2. Preliminary Plat Findings: 
Exhibit D 
In consideration of a preliminary plat, combined preliminary and final plat, or short plat, 
the dedsionomaking body shall make the following findings: 
1. The plat is in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan; 
City Council finds that the proposed application is in substantial compliance with the 
adopted Comprehensive Plan. City Council generally supports the proposed plat layout as 
J • • " 
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Exhibit D 
it complies with the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan. Please see Comprehensive 
Plan Policies and Goals, Section 8, of the Staff Report. 
2. Public services are available or can be made available and are adequate to 
accommodate the proposed development; 
City Council finds that public services are available to accorrunodate the proposed 
development. (See finding Items 3 and 4 above under Annexation Findings for more 
details.) 
3. The plat is in conformance with scheduled public improvements in accord with the 
City's capital improvement program; 
Because the developer is installing sewer, water, and utilities for the development at their 
cost, City Council finds that the subdivision will not require the expenditure of capital 
improvement funds. 
4. There is public financial capability of supporting services for the proposed 
development; 
See finding "Items 3 and 4 above under Annexation Findings above, and the Agency 
Comments and Conditions in Exhibit B for more detail. 
5. The development will not be detrimental to the public health, safety or general 
welfare; and 
City Council is not aware of any health, safety or environmental problems associated 
with the development of this subdivision that should be brought to the Council or 
Commission's attention. ACHD considers road safety issues in their analysis. 
6. The development preserves significant natural, scenic or historic features. 
City Council is unaware of any natural, scenic or historic features on this site. Therefore, 
City Council finds that the proposed development will not result in the destruction, loss 
or damage of any natural, scenic or historic feature(s) of major importance. 

